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This paper highlights the role of the armed forces and their impact on the process of political transition, and discusses civil-military relations in their various aspects: the state, society and the armed forces per se, in order to reveal the main pillars that constitute a balance between the power of political institutions (legislative and executive) and the military power of the army. Such a balance would lead to the subduing of the army to the civil authority, and confine military activities to security and defense. The paper focuses on the common characteristics shared by states that have succeeded in building democratic armies. To conclude, the author presents a set of recommendations addressed to activists and democrats, on what ought to be done and what should be avoided in the security-defense field during the process of democratic army building.

This study investigates the causes beneath the absence of non-Western theorizing efforts in the field of International Relations (IR), aiming to shed light on intellectually and politically defectiveness of the Arab World in the field, as manifested since the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions. To this end, the study discusses the position of the Arab World in IR and illustrates how the North (the Centre) deliberately ignores knowledge production on international relations from the South (the Periphery) through abstraction, reductionism, and exclusion. Finally, the study scrutinizes how the situation in the Arab World reflects the continuation of colonialism in two evident forms: epistemologically through the knowledge-power nexus; and by subjugation or keeping states, even those that are nominally independent, subservient to the Great Powers in international politics.

From a purely political perspective, tyranny and oligarchic rule have continued to be the dominant characteristic of Arab politics. Authoritarianism has “strangled” the Arab citizen. Will an over-arching Arab liberal tendency be able to overcome sectarian, political and religious tensions to affect a comprehensive reform of Arab political culture? The search for a definitive answer to this question proves difficult. The presumed link between the question of (political) reform within the Arab countries, in general terms, and a liberal perspective from foreign cultural contexts is supported by only a tenuous hypothesis. Such a presumptive hypothesis cannot guarantee results in a cultural and social environment completely alien from the one in which the principles of liberalism first emerged. This author calls for a revitalized conceptualization of liberty which is culturally appropriate to the Arab context while maintaining its connection to global contemporary civilization: it would be a conceptualization which liberates Arab societies from historicism and a blatant emulation of the West.

The question of post-revolutionary transitional justice is a novel feature of Arab political and legal culture. During the early stages of what came to be known as the “Arab Spring”, human rights organizations at home and abroad presented principles of transitional justice not only as an essential means to address violations of human rights of the past through legal and judicial channels, but also as an important stepping stone to accomplishing the broader aim of a democratic transition in the Arab region. The extent to which political actors adopted these demands varied with the revolutionary zeal of the moment in question. Ultimately, however, revolutionary zeal and the maximalist demands of the revolutionaries prevented the implementation of lessons learned from earlier post-revolutionary transitions around the world. This paper will illustrate the above by examining examples of transitional justice in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and compare these to experiences in non-Arab countries. It affirms that social reconciliation, peace and prosperity will only be possible through the establishment of both “truth” and justice.

This study addresses the methodological dimension of the gap between social research and public policymaking in the Arab region. It demonstrates several intertwined factors that contributed to this phenomenon, the most important of which are: lack of trust between researchers and decision makers, methodological dependency, the absence of a scientific culture that promotes research based evaluation, the lack of intellectual and moral courage among researchers and weak demand for the use of multifaceted holistic approaches. The study concludes that the success of enhancing coordination between social science research and policymaking in the Arab region depends on the extent to which academic freedoms are respected, considering this constitutes one of the most important elements of scientific research and competency. Academia must also be allowed to fulfill its role in developing serious and applicable scientific research.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

This study examines how the 2023 Gaza War reshaped maritime security dynamics and geopolitical rivalry in the Red Sea, particularly in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through a complex interplay between great powers and non-state actors. It demonstrates that the Houthi (Ansar Allah) attacks on commercial vessels –framed as support for Gaza – transformed the strait into a global flashpoint that exposed the vulnerability of international supply chains. The study also shows how these developments reactivated U.S.–China rivalry in the Red Sea: the United States adopted a military–security approach in support of Israel's war on Gaza and to reaffirm its role as guarantor of the maritime commons, while China favored a cautious strategy centered on economic influence, calculated non-involvement in military operations, and securing the passage of its vessels through discreet diplomatic channels. The study concludes that the Red Sea has become a space where U.S. naval dominance intersects with China's rising economic power, and where non-state actors increasingly shape regional and global security.

​This paper aims to analyze European Gulf relations based on the Interdependence created by the 1988 agreement, and the subsequent transformations in the relationships. The interdependence approach assumes that there is an overlap of interests between both parties, and a degree of mutual engagement, thus limiting conflict and enhancing cooperation and coordination, which entails harmonizing the movement of its parties within the international system. Nonetheless testing the effectiveness of this approach in the context of a crisis which divides one of the parties (the Gulf in our case) remains problematic. The paper tries to probe this issue, and reveal the limitations of the interdependence model in this context. It similarly attempts to test the impact of the Gulf Crisis on a European Sub Policy towards the Gulf by analyzing the behaviours of the main actors in the EU (Germany, France, and- despite brexit- the UK).