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​This paper deconstructs Muslim Brotherhood perceptions about the political rights of Copts in Egypt. It argues that the group has an ambiguous understanding of the concept of citizenship generally, which is reflected in their perceptions of the political and civil rights of religious, political and sectarian minorities. This study proposes a socio-political approach to understand this ambiguity. It argues that this position can be interpreted through several considerations, the most important of which are: ideological commitment, maintaining organizational cohesion, constraints on social acceptance and competition with conservative religious forces. The paper deconstructs these factors in order to explain and interpret the Brotherhood stance on Copts in Egypt. The study uses discourse analysis to examine statements by Muslim Brotherhood members and leaders about the Copts from 1981-2013.

The economic indicators which define inter-Arab economic, political and social diversity, as well as the differences between the Arab countries and their neighbouring countries serve to define the relative economic strengths of each of these countries. This paper adopts a quantitative-statistical approach to arrive at a series of mathematical relationships which serve to fulfil the purpose of this paper. Specifically, the paper seeks to arrive at a ranking of Arab states based on their relative economic power. In doing so, the paper will also seek to determine what the sources of economic strength or weakness for a given country.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

اﺗﺴﻤﺖ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ازﻣﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وا ﻣﺎرات واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪوء واﻟﺜﻘﺔ واﻻﺗﺰان. وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺐ أن ﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻘﻄﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ا زﻣﺔ، ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﺠﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻣﺮورًا ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺮﻣﺠﺔ، ﻣﻦ دون اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ "ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ". وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر ﻗﺪ ﺧﻄﻄﺖ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ا زﻣﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﻨﺢ اﻟﻈﻼم، ﻓﺠﺮ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮب "اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﻊ واﻟﺼﺪﻣﺔ" اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻓﺈن ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻣﺘﺼﺎص "اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ اوﻟﻰ"، ﺑﻼ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺄة. وﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ داء اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ وردة ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ إزاء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﻨﻌﻄﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ ازﻣﺔ، ﻳُﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗ ﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﻬﺪوء، واﻟﺜﻘﺔ، واﻻﺗﺰان، اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺴﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ اداء اﻟﻘﻄﺮي، وﻫﺬه اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻫﻲ: ﺳﻘﻮط ﻋﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﺟﺄة، وﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ "اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ"، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ، وارﺗﺒﺎك اﻟﺨﺼﻢ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴّﺔ، اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ، اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ. Since the outbreak of the crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on 24 May 2017, Qatar's diplomacy has been characterised by calm, confidence and balance. The observer can't understand the diplomatic approach of Qatar in dealing with all stages of the crisis - from explosion to siege, through state-orchestrated media campaigns - without knowing the "behind the scenes" facts. Blockading countries planned to blow the crisis up under the cover of darkness, before the dawn of May 24. But Qatar was, unsurprisingly, able to absorb the "shock and awe" first strike. Five factors characterise the country's diplomatic performance as it has reacted to developments and turning points in the crisis: The failure of the 'element of surprise', years of building Qatar's "nation brand", Qatar's arsenal of "soft power", international alliances, and the opponents' quandary.

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

For months, the transitional phase in Tunisia underwent a critical historical period that almost foiled efforts to establish a newly-born democratic state and undermined the foundational work of the post-revolution state. In fact, the increasing violence, the high living cost, the raging conflict over power, the intermittent rise of partisan, ideological and religious tensions, the return of the old regime media, the emergence of the harbingers of a counter-revolution and the decrease in Tunisia’s sovereign ranking showed followers of the situation that the Arab Spring in its first cradle was at risk. Citizens felt afraid, and they longed for stability and reassurance. The deteriorating political situation based on polarization and dispute between the ruling troika and the opposition added insult to injury. The paper sheds light on the situation of the prominent influential political parties in Tunisia and on the complexities of the political crisis. It also explores the prospects of the upcoming phase.

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is a policy formulated in the 1960s, and one that Israel has consistently applied until today. The paper examines the roots of this policy and the internal and external factors that contributed to its formulation. In this context it follows the influence of the United States by illustrating the development of contacts and negotiations between the US and Israel concerning the Israeli nuclear program, and the understandings between the two states during the 1960s, culminating in the agreement between Golda Meir and Nixon in 1969 over Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. The study also follows the debates and discussions between Israeli academics and experts over this policy since the 1980s. Finally, the paper also reviews Israel’s preparation for a second strike and analyzes the aims of Israel’s nuclear policy.

Beginning with a review of existing theories of international relations that discuss policies of penetration, this study examines current politics of the Arab regional order. Four different aspects of penetration are reviewed, including intra-Arab threats, rivalry between Arab states to occupy a central position, historical legacy, and multinational companies. The role of Arab elites in processes of penetration by means of their links with international powers and interests is also considered. The study looks at ‘soft’ penetration through an analysis of language, education, media, and civil society organizations, as well as “blatant penetration” like the occupation of Iraq and the spread of foreign military bases. Beyond Arab state actions, the paper also considers intervention by neighboring regional states. The paper finds that variation in the development of political, social, and economic systems has a corresponding influence on the levels of foreign penetration, infiltration, or influence. It also finds that analyzing the Arab region as a single regional system reveals a deep level of military, social, and economic penetration on all levels.

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.