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Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had held sit-ins outside the Rab’a Adawiya Mosque, on the edge of a Square located in the Nasr City district east of Cairo, before the forced dispersal by Egyptian security forces led to a massacre on August 2. Using aerial footage, Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 protestors were gathered at the square before the massacre. The steps taken to disperse the crowds had totally contradicted assurances by the Egyptian authorities, for example that the process would be gradual; that a security cordon would allow for the safe passage of women and children in particular; and that protestors would have sufficient warning to leave. Clearly, the massacre illustrates that the Egyptian authorities failed miserably in their duty to ensure that any loss of life resulting from the dispersal was kept to a bare minimum. This paper makes use of the evidence documented by Human Rights Watch on the events surrounding the dispersal of the Rab’a Square, concentrating on three main points: the violence of some of the protestors; the high death toll resulting from the dispersal; unjustified killings of protestors; and the lack of any safe exit routes for the protestors.

This paper seeks to understand the reason behind Egyptian political parties having resorted to popular protests as a tool of political action, as opposed to conventional means of political action available to formal political groupings, such as electoral competition. It also goes on to highlight the reasons which drive Egyptian political parties to adopt exclusionist rhetoric. Based on public opinion gained from the Arab Opinion Index, this paper argues that the resorting of Egyptian political parties to protests and exclusionist political rhetoric and tactics is rooted in a number of factors. These are largely due to the ineffectiveness of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency and the repeated political errors of the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which contribute to driving Egyptian political parties to other modes of action.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

Book Title: How I Stopped Being a Jew [Hebrew] Author: Shlomo Sand

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

The Egyptian revolution in 2011 and its related aftershocks in 2013 represent developments in a process that will decide a struggle within Egypt that has lasted over a century.

The author here examines the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian political process after the victory of the January 25 Revolution with a focus on former president Mohamed Morsi's one year in office. The paper begins by analyzing the structural developments and accompanying political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood while it was a force in the country's political opposition, and how the party reflected on its behavior after the January Revolution in general, but especially during Morsi's reign. The paper focuses on what is considered an exceptional moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood: when it went from being an opposition group to taking power in a formal government setting. It examines this extraordinary shift in light of the major challenges of managing the Egyptian state. The paper concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not disappear from the political scene given its deep integration into the Egyptian social fabric, and discusses strategies and paths that the organization could adopt in the post-coup era.

The Tunisian Tamarod (Rebellion) Movement replicated the experience of the Egyptian movement of the same name after the latter’s success in changing the nation’s head of state. The study analyzes the factors that led to the emergence of the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, such as the difficulties facing the transitional process, the slow pace of reforms, and the failure to achieve the goals of the revolution. This long list of grievances ranges from the failure to create jobs and provide justice for victims of injustice, to the continuation of widespread poverty and unemployment in the cities, and the problematic struggle for influence instead of power sharing leading to polarization not only between al-Nahda Party and the Nidaa Tounes Movement, but also between the ruling coalition and the opposition. The study explores the most important commonalities and differences between the Egyptian Tamarod Movement and the Tunisian Tamarod Movement, wondering whether the latter can change from a protest phenomenon to a force for change, and what its future holds in light of the new developments in the urban and political scene in Tunisia today.

This paper focuses first on the rising role of the army in Egyptian political life after the January 25 Revolution. Starting with its break away from former president Hosni Mubarak, to its assumption of power in taking on the task of managing the transitional period by overseeing the constitutional referendum as well as parliamentary and presidential elections, the paper traces critical moments and shifts in the relationship between the army, the people, and politics. The paper also documents the decline in the role of the army after Mohamed Morsi came to power, and after what is termed a “paradigm shift” represented by ousting Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Lieutenant General Sami Anan, and other members of the military council from the political scene. The paper then surveys within a theoretical framework the relationship of armies to democracy, offering examples of military interference in political life and comparing these with what happened in Egypt. Finally, the paper turns to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ultimatum, his request for authority and the subsequent fallout that put both sides of the crisis in Egypt on the brink of the abyss.