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This paper monitors the post-2007 trends of US foreign policy towards the Gaza Strip. This paper's discussion first examines the general framework of the US approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict before discussing the quandary posed by the Gaza Strip to that framework. The paper then focuses on the role played by President George W. Bush's administration in creating the impasse over Gaza, deconstructs the efforts to overthrow Hamas, and tracks the attempts to isolate and marginalize the Gaza Strip. Finally, it analyses the status of the Gaza Strip in the respective administrations of US presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The paper concludes that the Gaza Strip represents a predicament to both the US and Israel, to a large extent the outcome of flawed and biased US policies as well as symptomatic of the Zionist project in occupied Palestine; an outcome that cannot justify the crushing crisis caused by the official Egyptian blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Many American observers agree that the recent Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip represented a major challenge for the administration of President Barack Obama because it aggravated the international crises facing American foreign policy and shed light once again on the subject of the decline of American leadership. This paper discusses the decline in the capabilities of the American presidency under Obama and sheds light on the failure of the United States to deal, as it should have, with the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, which was unprecedented in size, destruction, and duration. The paper gives particular focus on the increasing inability of the United States to confront Israeli intransigence.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

This paper highlights the role of the armed forces and their impact on the process of political transition, and discusses civil-military relations in their various aspects: the state, society and the armed forces per se, in order to reveal the main pillars that constitute a balance between the power of political institutions (legislative and executive) and the military power of the army. Such a balance would lead to the subduing of the army to the civil authority, and confine military activities to security and defense. The paper focuses on the common characteristics shared by states that have succeeded in building democratic armies. To conclude, the author presents a set of recommendations addressed to activists and democrats, on what ought to be done and what should be avoided in the security-defense field during the process of democratic army building.

An agreement signed by the Russian Foreign Minister and his US counterpart in Moscow has taken observers by surprise due to its timing and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement in Moscow was the natural culmination of a series of events impacting the situation in Syria, including changes to the composition of Barack Obama’s Administration and an overall shift in American attitudes towards the Arab Spring. This has presaged a change in American vision towards its interests in the wider Middle East region and Washington’s relations with both regional powers and global players with influence on the Syrian conflict. Finally, the agreement can be regarded as an expression of American uncertainty, as well as the Obama Administration’s inability to formulate a coherent policy towards Syria two years into the revolution.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

An analysis of the strategic documents produced by the United States can play a significant role in understanding the comprehensive visions of successive administrations in dealing with the outside world. However, these documents cannot present a day-to-day picture of what a given administration might do amid rapidly evolving crises. In analyzing each document, these day-to-day strategic concerns, which in fact govern each US strategic document, must be taken into account. This study attempts to analyze the text of the 2015 UN national security strategy by taking into account the international context, its goals, priorities, and governing principles. The analysis carries out an assessment of six key strategic indicators in the strategy document, as well as nine indicators of change compared to the 2010 document. This paints a picture of the larger vision of the Obama administration and the White House, which will shape US foreign and security policy until the end of his term.

This study attempts to determine the latest changes in the US-Saudi alliance and reflect on its destabilization. Specifically, it aims to determine whether the current crisis in US-Saudi relations might actually lead to a rift. Alternatively, the current events could be nothing but a temporary breakup depending on each country’s vision of its interests, after which relations could resume. The study reached some important results. It concluded, for example, that the speculation of a collapse of the US-Saudi alliance and its replacement with the US-Iranian alliance is farfetched and lacks depth. It is politically impossible and strategically inoperable for the US to side with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia amid the current polarization.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.