Latest Articles

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

The premise of this study is the belief that there is a crisis in contemporary liberal democracy resulting from the tension between two traditions: one democratic and the other liberal. The spread of right-wing populism in the West is not a new phenomenon, but rather a new manifestation of what may be called a permanent crisis of democracy. The study distinguishes populism from totalitarian ideological movements that gain popular support through demagogy and incitement against the other and reviews existing tensions in the structure of liberal democracy. The paper finds that populist rhetoric is channeled through tensions in the structure of liberal democracy and translates social anger into criticism of the democratic system itself, by using one component of a complex democratic system against another.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

Globally, many countries are implementing decentralization programs as a means of promoting both democratic and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, however, scholarship has yet to offer a comprehensive framework within which to assess and reform central-local relations. This article seeks to overcome the "division of labor" that has long separated analyses of administrative and political structures, and to provide stronger conceptual vocabulary for describing and analyzing the complexities of centralization and decentralization in both administration and politics. After developing two distinct continua of administrative and political centralization/ decentralization, the paper then combines them in a single matrix able to highlight the wide range of strategies and outcomes that emerge from the complex interplay of the two spheres. Depending on where a country lies within the matrix, it is argued, decentralization strategies may do more harm than good. Devolution strategies are especially problematic in settings with strong local leaders, and should never be attempted without careful analysis of the preexisting character of central-local ties.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

Early in the transitional justice process during and after the Tunisian revolution, the need arose to develop a full-fledged legal framework guaranteeing the rights of victims and, at the same time, of perpetrators. However, no sooner was transitional justice legislation ratified than progress towards the objective faltered. In an atmosphere of partisan political turbulence, the legislation resulted in weak outcomes. This led to the conclusion that the foremost problem of transitional justice does not lie in an absence of political will as much as in the philosophy on which it is founded. This philosophy adheres to liberal democratic values in facing the painful past and restoring rights to victims of despotism – by stipulating a set of rights that put the victim and the executioner on the same footing, without the slightest consideration of the balance of power between them. Consequently, perpetrators and torturers tend to dodge justice and recognition of truth, equating reconciliation with accountability.

This paper explores the decision by the Egyptian government to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. One outcome of this new designation is that an Egyptian law covering terrorist organizations will apply to the country’s largest political party, one which had taken control of nearly 40% of seats in the (now disbanded) People’s Assembly, and more than one-quarter of votes cast in the first round of presidential elections (held in May, 2012).

Spin Dictators explores a new breed of dictators, growing in prevalence in recent years, who exploit the vast potential of the information age to tighten control and surveillance over society and individuals.