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What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.

This study examines the constitutional management of political transition in Algeria following the popular protests of February 2019 (the Hirak). After setting out the basic tenets of Transitional Constitutionalism, the study investigates the extent to which peaceful political change can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms or arrangements derived from inherited texts. In contrast to similar Arab cases, the Algerian experience was characterized by the adoption of a political plan to manage the transitional phase, based on constitutional measures derived from the texts in force. But it was not convincing for a large segment of the Hirak, who believed that these arrangements would restrict the path of change to reproduce the existing system at the expense of achieving peaceful political change. In this sense, managing the transitional political phase according to the applicable constitutional texts did not set a precedent. Rather, in Algeria, a kind of precedent was set in the restriction of the concept of constitutional solution to the literal requirements of the functional constitutional text, without partial constitutional amendments, nor a fundamental revision of the inherited legislative structure.

The Gulf Crises and Blockade of Qatar: Economic, Legal and Political Perspective

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

The Moroccan February 20 protest movement came with the mobilization of the Moroccan street through peaceful demonstrations demanding constitutional reforms in the framework of a parliamentary monarchy. The king, keen not to replicate what happened in neighboring states, could not ignore the February 20 movement. This pushed him to announce the program for constitutional reform in his speech on March 9, 2011. The strategy of the political regime to contain and defuse the February 20 movement led every initiative, including the project for the 2011 constitution, to become a resource and weapon in the hands of the authorities, and means for the symbolic and material suppression of the February 20 movement. The constitutional referendum of July 1, 2012, which was backed by the people, and which February 20 called to boycott, represented the beginning of the rapid demise of the movement, because it reinforced the legitimacy of reform, and hence the monarchy. The February 20 Movement represents an opportunity to rethink the meaning of opposition in Morocco, particularly when set against analysis formulated in the 1970s by pioneers such as John Waterbury and Rémy Leveau, who concluded that the opposition, despite its differences and variety of protests, served in the end to reproduce the existing political regime.

The referendum on the new Moroccan constitution in July 2011, which varied readings and perspectives around it, between supporters of the methodology and implications brought as necessary step towards democracy.

This paper examines the role of the constitution designing process in pushing the democratic transition towards cooperation, rather than conflict, in light of the great uncertainty that characterizes the democratic transition process regarding the future. The study focuses on four successful cases of democratic transition (Poland, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia) to identify the common factors that contributed to their success. Through its comparative approach, the study concludes that the process of constitution designing more socio-political than legal as it requires a great deal of bargaining and negotiations to achieve balance and harmony between the existing political and social actors. The study shows how the adoption of arrangements that limit the absolute power of the majority (counter- majoritarian measures) was one of the strategies used to assuage any fears and build confidence among the various political actors.

​This study examines the foundations and development of teaching political science in Sudanese universities. It begins with the establishment of Gordon Memorial College in 1902 which became later the University of Khartoum. This is because it is the oldest Sudanese university, and the first to teach political science. Influenced by the objectives of the Gordon Memorial College formation, the attachment with the University of London before independence, and the early lecturers who taught there, the department of political science in the university adopted curricula pursued in British universities. In addition, the study discusses the expansion of political science to include Umdurman Islamic University and other universities. Moreover, it analyzes the intellectual perspectives that influenced the development of teaching political science in Sudanese universities, curricula development, means of training, and the impact of politics and policies on political science teaching.

​This study provides an overview of development stages in post-conflict reconstruction since World War II. The authors attempt to summarize a set of lessons learned from accumulated experiences, which could then be used to better inform Arab decision-makers. The authors also call for an indigenous, Arab perspective, distinct from Western approaches, to post-conflict reconstruction policies. The first section in the study addresses the differences between the traditional definition of war and contemporary conflicts, focusing on how armed conflicts in the Arab region have caused vast levels of destruction requiring immense, cooperative efforts to aid in the post-conflict reconstruction. The paper goes on to explain the concepts and terminology which underpins post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, as well as the historical and analytical arc of the most significant milestones in the development of post-conflict reconstruction methodology.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.