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This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

​Many analysts and observers believe the opposition media played a critical role in ousting Morsi through their printed and television outlets, which reported against him for a whole year. This paper examines Egyptian media’s policies, starting from Morsi’s becoming president at the end of June 2012 and extending to the stage following his ouster until now. The paper lists the main strategies adopted by the media and lays out models of Egyptian media’s international coverage. It also explores the motives behind the work of some media outlets and their common traits and tries to explain why the media adopted this type of discourse. The paper also highlights the forms of provocation practiced by several Egyptian media outlets against the coup opponents and detects several rumors spread by the media and their source.

The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954 - 1958 , which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

The failure of the 15th of July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey will remain an exceptional landmark in Turkey’s modern history, as well as in the political legacy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Declaring the state of emergency, arresting thousands of individuals, temporarily dismissing tens of thousands of governmental employees for investigation, shutting down a number of universities and Islamic endowments under the pretext of fighting the “parallel state”, besides calling for the reconstruction of the military establishment, necessitates analyzing the possible repercussions of this coup attempt on Turkish political life. The paper will address this coup’s consequences by discussing the following: battling the “parallel state”, reconstructing the military establishment, writing a new constitution, and predicting possible turns in Turkish foreign policy.

Our study aims to put under scrutiny the Algerian army tasks and roles through different periods of time and this requires going back to the roots when the national liberation army was established, returning to the present as the army has become the institution protecting the state. An institution which has an everlasting organic relation with politics, embodying one of its central tasks. The study needs to highlight the above cited issues in its attempt to grasp and understand the army role during the 1992s' political crisis, and in so doing a particular attention is given to the ways how the army dealt with the crisis and what is the nature of its contribution in tackling and facing it. Finally, the study is concerned with the army role in the near future from a prospective approach.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

In 2015, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a massive contentious movement, known as "You Stink", in response to the unfolding of the waste crisis when the main landfill known as "Naameh" was closed. Though other opposition movements preceded it in the post-war period, "You Stink" succeeded in positioning itself as a threat to the continuity in power of the informal pillars of political power- the "politically relevant elites". Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify first those who are influential in framing national political agendas, hence targeted by the movement itself. Second, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key activists within "You Stink", the paper provides an exploratory analysis of the zu'ama's receptivity to it, unpacking the strategies employed to neutralize the movement. It concludes that in addition to obstructive strategies put into play by the zu'ama, certain operative caveats within the movement itself, acted as "political opportunities" to the former's capacity to neutralize and weaken the movement.

Book Title: The Boy Remains Missing [Hebrew] Original title: הילד עדיין איננו Author: Shoshi Zaid Year of publication: 2016 Publisher: Tel Aviv: Media 10 Pages: 248

This research aims to shed light on the continuous rise of the military's role in Sudanese politics, the efforts of civilian forces to contain this phenomenon, and the outcomes of these efforts. It focuses on the manifestations, causes, and consequences of the growing militarization during the three periods of military rule in Sudan. The research hypothesizes that the political role of the Sudanese military forces has steadily increased, leading to widespread militarization of the political, social, and economic spheres in Sudan and a continuous decline of democracy. This is attributed to party conflicts, the weakening of civil society, and the decline of a political culture supportive of democracy. Limiting the political role of the military and containing the phenomenon of militarization requires an agreement between civilian and military forces on a comprehensive national project, the development of political parties, the strengthening of civil society capacities, the promotion of democratic culture, the improvement of military oversight mechanisms, and the enhancement of democratic transition processes.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.