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The parliamentary experience in Morocco continues to excite the interest of politicians, researchers, academics, and those working in the press and media. This importance is heightened with the experience of the sixth parliament (1997-2002), which followed the adoption of the 1996 constitution, and which witnessed a decisive historical landmark in the form of two prominent events: the first peaceful transition of power in Morocco, and the transfer of rule from the late King Hassan II, who died on July 23, 1999, to King Mohamed VI. This experience made King Mohamed VI keen on historical continuity and the approach of the bicameral system (representative and consultative), and the rotation of power. The importance of this study derives from the relative paucity of relevant studies, and its attempt to understand this experience. This requires examining the constitutional amendments, the legislative elections and what accompanied them, as well as the outputs and successes of the practice of the parliamentary process.

This study discusses the evolution of transitional justice in Morocco, demonstrating how the work of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission established within the regime has remained subject to the constraints of Moroccan politics. The Commission was declared a success prematurely, but over time it became clear that the Moroccan model needed to be reevaluated. The study concludes that the idea of "justice to the extent possible" obstructed transitional justice. Not only did this slogan serve to obscure the full truth; it also provided insufficient impetus to continue pushing for broader institutional reform. Although Morocco has experienced something of a human rights revival in recent years, it still harbours pockets of "lawful" injustice, broadly signaling an absence of sovereign law.

​The 20 February movement was formed out of a defining moment in modern Moroccan political history, and forced the ruling regime to undertake a process to reform and give up some of its powers. This study takes a look at the path of the 20 February movement as it took shape in 2011. It looks at the defining role played by the group in the Arab Spring protests. It analyzes the components of the movement and the stages of its development and decline in addition to presenting factors that explain the potentials and setbacks it faced months after its beginning. These are related to the existing political and social opportunities in Morocco, in particular the nature of its political system, the position of main actors, as well as the regional and international atmosphere. The social framing of the movement and the limits of its ability to instigate a wide social movement among the poor and vulnerable social classes is also considered, as well as how the movement went about promoting its ideas, apart from the difficulties related to creating a common identity that can unite its contradicting components.

​The political game in Morocco has set rules and the royal institution plays a central role in its use of an approach that seeks to maintain the main political balance through soft guidance. The royal institution employs several strategies ranging from progressive integration to the implementation of restrictions, policies of repression, and use of torture as well as ignoring, feigning indifference, and taking a variety of other positions that skirt direct interference, which would cause the regime to appear authoritarian. This approach often leads to resolving outstanding problems instead of implementing threats. The paper argues that the political formula has enabled the Justice and Development Party to engage in the political arena on a practical level. The Islamists’ daily dealings with a complex reality, with all its problems and complications, have forced them to look for solutions with political officials either through consensus and coordination or by presenting their concerns to the parliament as an opposition party. This contributed a great deal to maturing and developing the party’s political experience despite the challenges posed by the parameters of the political game and the narrow margins it leaves for maneuvering.

The Moroccan February 20 protest movement came with the mobilization of the Moroccan street through peaceful demonstrations demanding constitutional reforms in the framework of a parliamentary monarchy. The king, keen not to replicate what happened in neighboring states, could not ignore the February 20 movement. This pushed him to announce the program for constitutional reform in his speech on March 9, 2011. The strategy of the political regime to contain and defuse the February 20 movement led every initiative, including the project for the 2011 constitution, to become a resource and weapon in the hands of the authorities, and means for the symbolic and material suppression of the February 20 movement. The constitutional referendum of July 1, 2012, which was backed by the people, and which February 20 called to boycott, represented the beginning of the rapid demise of the movement, because it reinforced the legitimacy of reform, and hence the monarchy. The February 20 Movement represents an opportunity to rethink the meaning of opposition in Morocco, particularly when set against analysis formulated in the 1970s by pioneers such as John Waterbury and Rémy Leveau, who concluded that the opposition, despite its differences and variety of protests, served in the end to reproduce the existing political regime.

Libyan crisis has been scrutinized through many analytical tools in order to understand its dynamics of escalation and ways to de-escalation, however, literature on the topic often focus on purely political and security variables. This study aims at tracing insights the political economy may provide to the crisis in Libya. First, some economic variables that give analytical significance to "Need" and "Greed" understandings has been presented, which confirms that they are not less important as compared to those brought from "Creed" and that a better understanding of the Libyan case as most of internal crises and conflicts requires that light being shed on political, social and economic interpretations alike. The study concludes that political economy understandings could be useful to de-escalation efforts through a package of measures.

This study focuses on the legal status of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (PDI) issued in 1988 by the Palestinian National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in light of the Palestinian Constitutional Court 2018 decision, which granted the declaration a "supra-constitutional" status—placing it above the Basic Law issued by the Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The authors characterize the legal nature of the PDI as a "Declaration of Rights" and argue that the Court, in issuing its decision, overstepped its interpretive power, deeming the decision flawed due to the political considerations behind it, aiming at enhancing the legitimacy of the PA by invoking the symbolic legitimacy of the PLO. The study comparatively showcases experiences from the United States, France, Egypt, and Algeria, revealing that none of these jurisdictions have granted Declarations of Rights a status superior to that of the constitution. The authors conclude that the Court's decision was unsound and that the PDI should be treated as a reference constitutional document, but not one that supersedes the Basic Law.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

The Gulf Crises and Blockade of Qatar: Economic, Legal and Political Perspective

What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.