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This study examines Sudanese peace agreements during the period 1972 – 2020 by analyzing the roots of the conflicts between the political center and the peripheral regions, through the lens of the concept of the heritage of origin , which reflects the accumulation of historical grievances rooted in political, economic, and cultural marginalization. The study argues that, since the colonial era, the central governments concentrated power and development in the Nile Valley at the expense of other regions, which gave rise to demands for equitable participation that later evolved into armed rebellions. Despite the signing of several peace agreements—such as the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), the Khartoum and Fashoda Agreements (1997), the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011), and the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (2020)—most of them relied on partial power- and wealth-sharing arrangements without addressing the structural roots of the conflicts. Added to this were the absence of trust between the parties, foreign mediation, the repeated violation of commitments, and the instrumentalization of agreements to serve short-term political interests. The findings confirm that the failure to sustain peace was a direct consequence of leaving the heritage of origin unaddressed, leading to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the continuation of armed conflicts in Darfur, the East, and the Two Areas. The study recommends rebuilding the foundations of peace on equal citizenship, fair development, and the recognition of cultural diversity as necessary conditions for breaking the cycle of war and achieving national stability.

This study raises several pressing questions: Was the fall of the Salvation Regime in Sudan the result of an internal initiative or the opposition coalition, or both? To what extent did external dynamics influence the overthrow of regime and the transition to democracy? Is the post-Salvation regime likely to follow a democratic trajectory, or will it turn into another authoritarian regime? The study concludes that it is likely that the agreed goal between the international powers and their authoritarian partners in the region is to move Sudan to a "hybrid" system, where the elements of the old authoritarian regime remain in power, while maintaining a minimum level of democracy. In addition, the ruling military-civilian coalition will find support from the United States and the European Union (and their regional allies), enabling it to dismantle the institutions of the former regime, accommodate a number of armed movements in the political process, and gradually integrate into the international (security and economic) system. Meanwhile, domestically, the transitional government will face challenges that may not only lead to the collapse of the transitional process, but also to the collapse of the Sudanese state itself.

This research aims to shed light on the continuous rise of the military's role in Sudanese politics, the efforts of civilian forces to contain this phenomenon, and the outcomes of these efforts. It focuses on the manifestations, causes, and consequences of the growing militarization during the three periods of military rule in Sudan. The research hypothesizes that the political role of the Sudanese military forces has steadily increased, leading to widespread militarization of the political, social, and economic spheres in Sudan and a continuous decline of democracy. This is attributed to party conflicts, the weakening of civil society, and the decline of a political culture supportive of democracy. Limiting the political role of the military and containing the phenomenon of militarization requires an agreement between civilian and military forces on a comprehensive national project, the development of political parties, the strengthening of civil society capacities, the promotion of democratic culture, the improvement of military oversight mechanisms, and the enhancement of democratic transition processes.

This study explores the trajectory of state disintegration in Sudan from 1821 to 2025 , starting from a central question: does the April 2023 war constitute a revealing variable that exposes a process of structural disintegration whose foundations accumulated over time? Or is it an explanatory variable that, in itself, drives the deepening of this disintegration? Drawing on a historical sociology approach, the study analyzes the interaction of five main variables addressed in the literature on state disintegration: war, elite conflict, geostrategic intervention, erosion of legitimacy, and the pressures of globalization. The study shows that successive wars and resource depletion, along with ethnic/regional elite divisions and international competition over the Red Sea, have undermined the state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, leading to a hybrid pattern of disintegration in which the center retains international recognition while power is effectively distributed among local armed networks. The study concludes that existing models of state disintegration explain important aspects of the Sudanese experience, but require further development to accommodate forms of multiple sovereignties and managed disintegration.

​This article discusses relations between Sudan and Iran against the background of the many Israeli air strikes against Sudan, and asks whether the ruling regime in Sudan favors Iran over the Arab states when it comes to dealing with its political and security concerns, or whether Sudan sees no issue in playing both sides. It also examines the dreams of Islamic leadership and the transnational revolutionary tendency espoused by Hassan al-Turabi, and the effect of this among his disciples in terms of their view of and links with Iran. The study also takes Iranian support for Islamic movements in Gaza via Sudan as an example of cooperation where the tactical and short term intersects with long term strategy. The paper also discusses the Islamists’ coming to power as a result of the Arab revolutions, and the potential for the revival of transnational revolution included in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and the effect of this on relations between the Arab states and their collective and individual relations with Iran.

This study discusses the institutional legacy of economic liberalization policies in shaping the contemporary reality of civil-military relations in Arab Spring states, and the future challenges of democratic transformation in these countries. It argues that economic openness through the application of liberalization policies has led to the emergence of a military oligarchy operating under a civilian cover, formally extending the dominance of the Arab armies from the political to the economic sphere. The outcome of this dynamic was the consolidation of the positions and political dominance of the military, which poses great challenges to the future of democratic transition in these countries. The study reviews its hypothesis through the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and Algeria, and draws analytical comparisons between them.

​​This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.​

This study examines the impact of securitization on the democratization of three countries in the in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan. The three countries, all members of the Arab League, represent diverse but integrated securitization models. The study assumes that securitization in the region has left democratic transformation low in the list of priorities for the major powers, at a time when counterterrorism rhetoric is overwhelming. The paper raises the following questions: Why has securitization discourse overpowered talk of democracy in the Horn of Africa? How do the mechanisms of the securitization discourse interact with political reality? What is the role of regional institutions in enhancing securitization discourse?

Looking at the results of the mid-April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan, the paper reviews the changes that have occurred amid the last presidential cycle under al-Bashir (2010-2015). The election results are analyzed against a background of the South's succession when Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenues and entered a severe economic crisis, and a period when war erupted in the South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states, and unrest continued in the Darfur states. This will also be put into the context of a collapse of Islamist powers in Sudan, the decline of the role of the Islamic movement in the political process, President Bashir's exclusion of Islamist leaders who defected form Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, the rise of generals to power, and their control of the leadership of the Islamic movement itself. Further, the implications of the broad boycott of the elections, the loss of trust in the national electoral commission, and the implication of the growing number of independent candidates are taken into account. Finally, the paper examines Sudan's disengagement with Iran its attempt to return to the Arab fold as a last attempt to buy additional years for the ruling regime.

This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.