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Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

Egypt’s soft power is one of the strongest cards and tools of Egyptian power in the region. This study aims at highlighting the ebb and flow of Egypt’s soft power since the end of World War II, if not before. It explores its sources and forms, how it was employed to fulfill national and nationalistic interests as well as the factors and reasons that led to its decline in the Arab world and the region. The study also focuses on the repercussions of this decline on Egypt’s future power and its situation. The study states several factors or variables that must be taken into account to revive Egypt’s soft power which must include political reform, building a democratic state and reshaping and rehabilitating Egypt’s human resources and developing their skills. The study states that the most needed factor to reignite Egypt’s soft power revolves around giving Egypt’s political regime its legitimacy and appeal back.

This paper offers insights into the Crisis of Liberal International Order by combining Ibn Khaldun's theory of change with scholarship on liberalism and race. We argue that the crisis emerges from the incongruence of two features of liberal order: a binding feature (or 'assabiyya) of white supremacy and liberalism's principles of equality. The crisis is an outcome of a normative political order that can no longer balance a material and discursive reality of racialised hierarchy with ideals of equality. The crisis cannot be reduced to bad leadership or a technical failure to enact liberal values. Instead, attempts to think beyond the crisis must acknowledge the incongruence between white supremacy and liberal equality. Through this diagnosis, we gesture towards the constructive use of "non-Western" theory in the discipline of International Relations.

​What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index's 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance.

This study attempts to understand the concept of the "deep state" given its increasing use in political literature and analysis. This happens especially in comparative studies and, specifically, when multiple political systems are addressed. Through an analysis of the literature in which the term is used, it is clear that the concept of the "deep state" is ambiguously understood and applied. This study is based on a critical view of the concept. It assumes that the vagueness of its definition is tinged with secrecy. Its fragmented usage in a variety of political systems (democratic, semi-democratic and authoritarian), render it an analytical tool that is not useful nor capable to expand knowledge of comparative political science. In lieu of this hypothesis, the study reveals discrepancies in the usage of the concept of "deep state", in an attempt to refine the concept.

The paper provides indications and analysis of the positions of the most influential Shia powers and parties in Iraq after the fall of the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul and the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014. In addition to the Najaf-based supreme Shia religious authority led by ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shia parties represented in government since 2003, the paper shed light on the increasingly powerful Iran-backed armed groups Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) and how their appeal, visibility and influence had changed after the fall of Mosul. The question of the Iraqi national identity and how it interacts with the Shia identity is addressed in the paper in light of the discourse of the Shia powers and relations between Shia Iraqis and other communities.

The current Sinai issue poses many questions on the nature of the escalating violence there, the reasons for its emergence

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?

This paper highlights the mental and political changes that took place in Russian society after the fall of the Soviet Union. An examination of these changes is significant because it fills a gap in research that relies on original sources written by Russians in Russian. This shift is analyzed with particular focus on the Russian position in Syria following its Revolution, a position that surprised analysts. This surprise in itself is evidence that Russia, in relation to the Arab world, remains a mystery. In order to assess the decisions taken, a look into emerging political forces in Russia and their overall objectives seems necessary. These forces hold strong subjective power, and after the years of weaknesses after the collapse of the Soviet Union, forces in the country are again looking internationally. This study is an initial attempt to determine the general view of the intellectual and political shifts in Russia.