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What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.

This paper examines the role of the constitution designing process in pushing the democratic transition towards cooperation, rather than conflict, in light of the great uncertainty that characterizes the democratic transition process regarding the future. The study focuses on four successful cases of democratic transition (Poland, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia) to identify the common factors that contributed to their success. Through its comparative approach, the study concludes that the process of constitution designing more socio-political than legal as it requires a great deal of bargaining and negotiations to achieve balance and harmony between the existing political and social actors. The study shows how the adoption of arrangements that limit the absolute power of the majority (counter- majoritarian measures) was one of the strategies used to assuage any fears and build confidence among the various political actors.

​This review discusses the main findings of the report issued by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral entitled The Global State of Democracy 2021: Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era.

Since the mid-1990s Morocco has traversed several stages of political and constitutional reforms. These were characterized by a restructuring of the political field in keeping with constitutional methodology and political consensus and were the precondition for the process of rapprochement between political actors. However, if this rapprochement or political openness transformed the electoral process into something diminished in practical terms, it in turn intensified the expansion of the protest arena, the accumulation of skills and experience among protesters, the development of more independent coordination capabilities, and the weakening of the regime's polarizing tendencies. This development imposes upon the political class a renewal of its discourse and means and modalities of communication, in the short and medium terms, to prevent continued erosion of its credibility.

In 2015, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a massive contentious movement, known as "You Stink", in response to the unfolding of the waste crisis when the main landfill known as "Naameh" was closed. Though other opposition movements preceded it in the post-war period, "You Stink" succeeded in positioning itself as a threat to the continuity in power of the informal pillars of political power- the "politically relevant elites". Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify first those who are influential in framing national political agendas, hence targeted by the movement itself. Second, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key activists within "You Stink", the paper provides an exploratory analysis of the zu'ama's receptivity to it, unpacking the strategies employed to neutralize the movement. It concludes that in addition to obstructive strategies put into play by the zu'ama, certain operative caveats within the movement itself, acted as "political opportunities" to the former's capacity to neutralize and weaken the movement.

This study attempts to understand the concepts of democratic consolidation and of dictatorship, and explains which is closer to coming about in the Turkish state after the experience of the past sixty years. Despite the reforms undertaken by the AKP since it came to power in 2002 that aimed to curtail the constitutional and legal pretexts allowing the military to intervene in political life, there have been notable changes in the Turkish scene, especially in 2013 and 2014. It has been implied that Turkey is on course to consolidate dictatorship, and this makes the third and final phase of democratization in Turkey subject to very different assessments. On this basis, the study attempts to answer a key question: where is Turkey heading, towards democratic consolidation or towards dictatorship?

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

The relationship between economies and polities is one of vital importance to the outcome of the contemporary intensifying struggle between authoritarians and democrats. Investigating this relationship in Egypt is therefore of relevance for the world as a whole, increasingly divided as it is between countries with political economies informed by authoritarian or democratic models. This study will explore manifestations of that vital relationship in Egypt. It will commence by outlining the global and national contexts within which the economy operates, and both shape it and present challenges that must be met to achieve more rapid growth. How economic factors have contributed to the rise of Sisi's new authoritarianism will then be investigated. This will be followed by reversing that relationship, analyzing the economic consequences of the Sisi regime. Whether those consequences will better enable Egypt to compete economically, or will undermine its capacities to do so, is addressed in the fourth section. That is followed by an effort to answer the related question of what the key building blocks of a more successful economic strategy might be. In the conclusion scenarios of alternative futures of Egypt's political economy are considered.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.