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The economic indicators which define inter-Arab economic, political and social diversity, as well as the differences between the Arab countries and their neighbouring countries serve to define the relative economic strengths of each of these countries. This paper adopts a quantitative-statistical approach to arrive at a series of mathematical relationships which serve to fulfil the purpose of this paper. Specifically, the paper seeks to arrive at a ranking of Arab states based on their relative economic power. In doing so, the paper will also seek to determine what the sources of economic strength or weakness for a given country.

This study reassesses the experience of political openness in Algeria within the analytical and explanatory categories of political economy. It is built on the premise that the transition from a totalitarian authoritarian regime to a democratic one presupposes the transition from a rentier economy linked to the external market and dominated by rentier groups, to a productive economy based on the national bourgeoisie exploitation of local labour to create wealth. The study argues that the experience of democratic transition in Algeria faltered due to the failure of the rentier groups to undergo capitalist transformation that could have allowed the emergence of the two main sides of the democratic equation: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The political elites that control the rentier economy were willing to accept political but not economic reforms that could have led to a reconsideration of the hegemonic relations within society and liberated it from the grip of power. In this regard, the failure of the economic reforms introduced by the Hamrouche government (1989 - 1991) was a prelude to the disruption of the democratic transition and prevention of the development of a civil society capable of gaining its independence from authority and, on the other hand, the independence of the Algerian state from the global market.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

The contemporary Yemeni state is characterized by strife and complications involving all aspects of the state and society. These complexities go back to the era of its inception and continue today, leaving serious implications for the political, geographic and social unity of Yemen. There are very clear intersections between the internal (political, economic, social) and external components, which contribute to the sustained crisis in the Yemeni state. Successive Yemeni governments have failed to fulfill their assumed duties and functions, thus preventing them from dealing with all kinds of foreign interventions. Moreover, tribal and sectarian roles in Yemen have historically prevailed over other Yemeni political roles, which have not succeeded in transferring Yemen to civil rule. Nor have they managed to build a democratic model that achieves stability and allows Yemenis to participate actively in the political and economic process, consolidate the concepts of citizenship and the rule of law, and safeguard the various rights and freedoms of all members of Yemeni society.

The success and widespread deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) have raised awareness of the technology's economic, social, and political consequences. Each new step in the development and application of AI is accompanied by speculations about a supposedly imminent but largely fictional artificial general intelligence (AGI) with (super-)human capacities, as seen in the unfolding discourse about capabilities and impact of large language models (LLMs) in the wake of ChatGPT. These far- reaching expectations lead to a discussion on the societal and political impact of AI that is largely dominated by unfocused fears and enthusiasms. In contrast, this article provides a framework for a more focused and productive analysis and discussion of AI's likely impact on one specific social field: democracy. First, it is necessary to be clear about the workings of AI. This means differentiating between what is at present a largely imaginary AGI and narrow artificial intelligence focused on solving specific tasks. This distinction allows for a critical discussion of how AI affects different aspects of democracy, including its effects on the conditions of self-rule and people's opportunities to exercise it, equality, the institution of elections, and competition between democratic and autocratic systems of government. This article shows that the consequences of today's AI are more specific for democracy than broad speculation about AGI capabilities implies. Focusing on these specific aspects will account for actual threats and opportunities and thus allow for better monitoring of AI's impact on democracy in an interdisciplinary effort by computer and social scientists.

This research aims to shed light on the continuous rise of the military's role in Sudanese politics, the efforts of civilian forces to contain this phenomenon, and the outcomes of these efforts. It focuses on the manifestations, causes, and consequences of the growing militarization during the three periods of military rule in Sudan. The research hypothesizes that the political role of the Sudanese military forces has steadily increased, leading to widespread militarization of the political, social, and economic spheres in Sudan and a continuous decline of democracy. This is attributed to party conflicts, the weakening of civil society, and the decline of a political culture supportive of democracy. Limiting the political role of the military and containing the phenomenon of militarization requires an agreement between civilian and military forces on a comprehensive national project, the development of political parties, the strengthening of civil society capacities, the promotion of democratic culture, the improvement of military oversight mechanisms, and the enhancement of democratic transition processes.

This review discusses the background of Technocracy Rising, and transformations in economics, governance, law, sustainable development and global order

This paper discusses the proposition of the rise of social Islam in Morocco by studying the country's two largest political Islam movements, the Justice and Charity Association (jamāʿat al-ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān) and the Unity and Reform Movement (ḥarakat al tawḥīd wa l-iṣlāḥ). It focuses on the concept of social Islam which implies the provision of financial and in-kind assistance and healthcare, education, athletic, artistic, and pedagogical services to a variety of social strata. The study proceeds from the rise of social Islam, how it relates to the concept of the urban poor under the development "crisis" Morocco has faced since the 1980s, and highlighting the social implications for the most important social stratum: the lower middle class and the poor. The study shows that the Islamist movements under study have managed to form new and old bonds of solidarity on a religious or tribalist basis, which have replaced traditional forms of solidarity that previously used to embrace the lower and lower middle classes.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

​​​The debate continues over the "Arab Spring" revolutions and the evaluation of their results continues, especially within the framework of the "success-failure" dichotomy, based on sociological analysis tools that generally emphasize their shortcomings. This study argues that these revolutions have reformist goals with value-oriented and normative contents touching on the core of the political question, which are no less important than material goals such as regime overthrow. Attempting to provide an alternative interpretation of the Arab situation through a different epistemological approach, this study aims to demonstrate the non-material political content of the Arab revolutions by incorporating normative and sociological ideas and conceptions into a new conceptual and methodological approach. Accordingly, the study adresses the political dimensions of revolutionary demands: the decisive rejection of authoritarianism and affirmation of political rights. While attempting to refute the assessment of the Arab revolutions as a failure to achieve democratic transition, it posits that the non-material revolutionary purpose is to highlight a "return to politics" as a basis for future political and democratic change. This is a call to rethink all aspects of Arab politics and to establish new foundations for a contractual relationship between the state and society that meets the conditions of the time.​