Latest Articles

The Palestinian Authority today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy, has led to a situation in which the PA's days may be numbered. This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the PA's promised territory. But Palestinian society today has undergone immense transformation since 1994; Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, and its formalized institutions which have overtaken Palestinian society for the past two decades disappear, how will Palestinians respond? Will the territories degenerate into violence, or will Palestinians coordinate to undertake strategies to organize a Palestinian response? This brief review Palestinian public opinion on preferences for non-violent strategies versus violent strategies, and examines what variables impact this dynamic.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

​This study fits into a broad category of scholarship concerned with transitional periods in various political systems. Specifically, it examines the political transition in post-revolutionary Tunisia since 2011. It does so by comparing the legal provisions of the post-revolutionary transition - the major texts, which define the transitional stage - and the political realities, which take the shape of events, actions and political discourse. A point of particular focus is the 2011 elections to the National Constituent Assembly, which the author analyzes through the rubric of "electoral engineering". One more conclusion of the paper is that electoral engineering remains a feature of Tunisian politics, although it has gone from "authoritarian electoral engineering" to "democratic electoral engineering," reflecting changes which have taken in the country as a whole.

The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.

The purpose of this paper is to study the Algerian experience with the Arab spring by identifying the nature of the protests movements in Algeria, to search the adaptation mechanisms of the Algerian political regime with the protest act and to answer the question: why the change in Algeria is so hard to happen? Next, this paper will expose a range of the most important political bets to understand better the Algerian exception by searching the roots of the crisis which has been overcomed in searching a radical and real reform. Finally, this paper will be concluded by addressing the prospects of political, institutional and economical changes and by exposing a future scenarios of the hard transition in light of internal and external challenges.

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

Today, India is actively engaged in projecting its influence beyond its geographic proximity. It has a proactive policy based on national interests and driven by its growing needs, particularly for energy imports, and an ambition to achieve a position of global prominence. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is of great geopolitical importance to India's strategy because of its geographic proximity, the abundance of energy resources, the great financial assets, and as the place with the largest Indian immigrant community. Nevertheless, many regional contenders may challenge India's interests in the region. This article discusses the geopolitical and economic importance of the GCC states and their current position in India's strategy. It explores the driving forces behind novel strategic partnerships between them. It also analyses how third-party relations with the GCC states or India may affect their relationships, such as China, Pakistan, and Iran. It also focuses on the new containment policy of India and China and their geopolitical contest over the Gulf and the GCC's hydrocarbon and financial assets.