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Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This study examines Sudanese peace agreements during the period 1972 – 2020 by analyzing the roots of the conflicts between the political center and the peripheral regions, through the lens of the concept of the heritage of origin , which reflects the accumulation of historical grievances rooted in political, economic, and cultural marginalization. The study argues that, since the colonial era, the central governments concentrated power and development in the Nile Valley at the expense of other regions, which gave rise to demands for equitable participation that later evolved into armed rebellions. Despite the signing of several peace agreements—such as the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), the Khartoum and Fashoda Agreements (1997), the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011), and the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (2020)—most of them relied on partial power- and wealth-sharing arrangements without addressing the structural roots of the conflicts. Added to this were the absence of trust between the parties, foreign mediation, the repeated violation of commitments, and the instrumentalization of agreements to serve short-term political interests. The findings confirm that the failure to sustain peace was a direct consequence of leaving the heritage of origin unaddressed, leading to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the continuation of armed conflicts in Darfur, the East, and the Two Areas. The study recommends rebuilding the foundations of peace on equal citizenship, fair development, and the recognition of cultural diversity as necessary conditions for breaking the cycle of war and achieving national stability.

This paper examines the 2012 General National Congress (GNC) elections in Libya, analyzing their implications and the interpretations that framed them as a victory for the liberal bloc (the National Forces Alliance) over the Islamist faction (the Justice and Construction Party and its allies). The paper reveals that this interpretation lacks accuracy, highlighting that a significant number of winning independent candidates were affiliated with Islamist movements. It also argues that Islamists later succeeded in consolidating their control within the GNC, leveraging their alliances to pass laws that excluded their political opponents. These elections marked a turning point in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi, representing the country's first democratic experiment in building a new political system despite the challenges inherited from the previous era. The paper examines the electoral system, key competitors, election results, and internal conflicts within the GNC, concluding that Islamist dominance after 2012 challenges the idea of a liberal victory.

The fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 following the assault by armed factions, with ISIL at the forefront, represented a major point of transformation for the political scene in Iraq, particularly following the withdrawal of the Iraqi military and police, and the succession of cities in northern and western Iraq that fell to ISIL. This paper looks at the accelerating developments in the Iraqi crisis since 2014. It tries to understand and describe the event, and presents two current narratives: the first is that ISIL is the only actor responsible for the planning and implementation of what happened and is happening; and the second observes the revival of the Sunni opposition movements in the context of the Anbar uprising against the Iraqi government. The paper reviews the positions of the forces active internally: the Iraqi government and its allies, the armed factions and their allies, and the Iraqi political forces participating in the political process, and externally in the region and on the global scene.

The study concerns the armed Shiism in Iraq and its most prominent embodiment, the Mahdi Army (MA). It deals with the relationship between the MA and the Sadrist movement, as a case og the relationship between political organizations and their armed wings. It explores the specificity of this relationship, whereby the MA arose within the Najaf Shiite's Hawza . Hence, the MA was not a typical armed wing, but was more like a general beacon of mobilization for the Shiite community in Iraq. MA was the first organizational step for the movement as much as its presence as the armed wing remained an essential pillar, controlling and determining the development of the movement. The study argues that the debate over the extent of armed action led to a struggle over the identity of the movement, between two wings: remaining an armed organization, or turning to political action. Therefore, the leadership's efforts to control MA were intersects with the political struggle between its wings.

This study explores the trajectory of state disintegration in Sudan from 1821 to 2025 , starting from a central question: does the April 2023 war constitute a revealing variable that exposes a process of structural disintegration whose foundations accumulated over time? Or is it an explanatory variable that, in itself, drives the deepening of this disintegration? Drawing on a historical sociology approach, the study analyzes the interaction of five main variables addressed in the literature on state disintegration: war, elite conflict, geostrategic intervention, erosion of legitimacy, and the pressures of globalization. The study shows that successive wars and resource depletion, along with ethnic/regional elite divisions and international competition over the Red Sea, have undermined the state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, leading to a hybrid pattern of disintegration in which the center retains international recognition while power is effectively distributed among local armed networks. The study concludes that existing models of state disintegration explain important aspects of the Sudanese experience, but require further development to accommodate forms of multiple sovereignties and managed disintegration.

This research aims to shed light on the continuous rise of the military's role in Sudanese politics, the efforts of civilian forces to contain this phenomenon, and the outcomes of these efforts. It focuses on the manifestations, causes, and consequences of the growing militarization during the three periods of military rule in Sudan. The research hypothesizes that the political role of the Sudanese military forces has steadily increased, leading to widespread militarization of the political, social, and economic spheres in Sudan and a continuous decline of democracy. This is attributed to party conflicts, the weakening of civil society, and the decline of a political culture supportive of democracy. Limiting the political role of the military and containing the phenomenon of militarization requires an agreement between civilian and military forces on a comprehensive national project, the development of political parties, the strengthening of civil society capacities, the promotion of democratic culture, the improvement of military oversight mechanisms, and the enhancement of democratic transition processes.

Sponsored by the “Safer World” foundation, based in the United Kingdom, this meeting held at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies examined possibilities for the spreading of peace and stability across conflict hotspots around the globe.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.