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This study adopts the regulatory state thesis to highlight the changes that have occurred in the economic and social role of the state and then the way in which public policy problems are addressed. The discussion focused on the regulatory policies of the telecommunications sectors following the economic liberalization of these markets and their opening to competition, through examining three cases in the Arab region: Egypt, the UAE and Qatar. The study is based on the hypothesis that the shift in the role of the state from the welfare state model, whereby the state and its institutions played the main role in the operations of providing communications services, to the regulatory state model, whereby the country adopts strategies to liberalize those markets, has necessitated making room for non-state actors to play an expanding role as a telecommunications service provider and operator. At the same time, the state has become the regulator that controls the behavior of new actors by designing regulations and legislation that control the rhythm of service delivery processes in liberalized telecom markets, in a manner that guarantees the quality of the services provided, and in a way that benefits the users.

This study addresses the extent to which the "participatory" framework is compatible with the networks of Tunisian elites since the Revolution of 2011. The author seeks to understand, analyze and interpret the theoretical approaches which allowed Tunisian politicians to reduce the level of political divisions within the country. The author further illustrates how Tunisia's formal political parties adapted and developed in the post-revolutionary setting, despite the revolution unraveling the vast extent of a societal rift in Tunisia which has dominated the country's political debates since that time. Finally, the study explores in depth the role and influence of Tunisian political elites as it relates to the praxis of participatory democracy, something which could not have been possible without the consciousness and awareness of these elites and their duty to fulfill their roles.

This study addresses the extent to which the "participatory" framework is compatible with the networks of Tunisian elites since the Revolution of 2011. The author seeks to understand, analyze and interpret the theoretical approaches which allowed Tunisian politicians to reduce the level of political divisions within the country. The author further illustrates how Tunisia's formal political parties adapted and developed in the post-revolutionary setting, despite the revolution unraveling the vast extent of a societal rift in Tunisia which has dominated the country's political debates since that time. Finally, the study explores in depth the role and influence of Tunisian political elites as it relates to the praxis of participatory democracy, something which could not have been possible without the consciousness and awareness of these elites and their duty to fulfill their roles.

​The political game in Morocco has set rules and the royal institution plays a central role in its use of an approach that seeks to maintain the main political balance through soft guidance. The royal institution employs several strategies ranging from progressive integration to the implementation of restrictions, policies of repression, and use of torture as well as ignoring, feigning indifference, and taking a variety of other positions that skirt direct interference, which would cause the regime to appear authoritarian. This approach often leads to resolving outstanding problems instead of implementing threats. The paper argues that the political formula has enabled the Justice and Development Party to engage in the political arena on a practical level. The Islamists’ daily dealings with a complex reality, with all its problems and complications, have forced them to look for solutions with political officials either through consensus and coordination or by presenting their concerns to the parliament as an opposition party. This contributed a great deal to maturing and developing the party’s political experience despite the challenges posed by the parameters of the political game and the narrow margins it leaves for maneuvering.

The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.