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Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

The paper focuses on transnational human rights activism and its efforts to influence the human rights landscape in Egypt. It argues that the global human rights system has provided a space for resisting authoritarianism in Egypt and that its significance has grown amid the widespread restrictions on civil and political rights, as well as the forced or voluntary relocation of many human rights activists and political actors into exile. The paper further reveals that the extent of the Egyptian government’s response to pressures from transnational networks is shaped by domestic, regional, and international conditions and factors—including the impact of counter- discourses and strategies that enable authoritarian regimes to contain and weaken the effects of transnational networks. The paper draws on a diverse set of primary and secondary sources, including publications from international and local human rights organizations, government statements, and media reports, in addition to semi- structured interviews with a group of Egyptian human rights defenders.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

​This paper proposes an approach to studying the impact of the Internet on political culture through the concept of collective memory. Departing from the traditional approaches that confine political culture to knowledge, orientations, and behavior, to constructive and interpretive frameworks that define it through the process of "meaning-making," collective memory emerges as an essential component of political culture with its meanings, symbols, and narratives about political life. The paper concludes – from examining the case of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 – that the development of the Internet may limit the role of the state and the elite in shaping political culture and collective memory, but it may also increase the severity of political and social polarization and weaken the culture of tolerance towards the other, and the chances of achieving social reconciliation, which is what we call the "paradox of collective memory".

​This paper examines the state of Political Science in Egypt, suggesting that the Egyptian school of Political Science is facing a crisis and analyses the reasons why. It particularly focuses on the experience of the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, as the first specialized school for Political Science in Egypt, in view of the increasing roles played by its graduates in the public sphere. The study focuses on three key dimensions: the perceptions of this scholarly community regarding the role entrusted to political science in Egyptian society and politics, the changes in academic curricula, and the ideological and political contexts influencing teaching and research in political science in Egypt. The study concludes that the crisis of political science in Egypt is twofold: the crisis within the field in general and specific issues within the Egyptian context itself.

The current Sinai issue poses many questions on the nature of the escalating violence there, the reasons for its emergence

What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.