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Establishing a genuine and effective system to settle disputes through ministerial conferences is an essential point of progress for developing countries. Such a system would mean these states– and Arab countries in particular – would defend their rights based on a legal rather than economic basis. This paper argues that developing countries’ inability to benefit fully from the advantages of a dispute settlement system poses an essential and fundamental problem. It shows how the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system has failed to become an effective tool in the hands of developing countries to repair imbalances resulting from unequal economic relations between countries. It then asks why developing countries – including Arab countries – have taken part in this system. It examines the root cause of this participation, asking wither it is due to subjective factors such as limited contribution in WTO or the lack of specialized national talents? Or objective obstacles that the system places before developing countries, especially in terms of long and demanding procedures, as well as the nature of the implementation process. The paper encourages a reconsideration of the system in order to keep it in line with the positions and potentials of developing countries. In its approach, this paper adopts analysis at two levels; the first looking into the outcome of the participation of developing countries in dispute settlement, and the second a reading of plans to reform the structures of the system.

This paper will examine the situation which can be described as the “Blockade of Qatar”, and particularly the legal ramifications of this blockade and the avenues of action available through international law channels and intra-state apparatus. The paper is premised on the argument that the deliberate, multilateral actions taken by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt against Qatar are not only punitive, but also represent a violation of the principles of international law and of the foundations for the relations between states in times of crisis. Given the use of force to enforce the blockade, the political and economic boycott of Qatar by a group of countries in the region could be legally defined as punitive measures. This paper concludes that the actions taken by the group of countries blockading Qatar provide an adequate basis for the activation of international mechanisms for international arbitration. Specifically, the author contends that Qatar would be justified in pursuing political and judicial redress against the group of countries concerned.

​This paper aims to analyze European Gulf relations based on the Interdependence created by the 1988 agreement, and the subsequent transformations in the relationships. The interdependence approach assumes that there is an overlap of interests between both parties, and a degree of mutual engagement, thus limiting conflict and enhancing cooperation and coordination, which entails harmonizing the movement of its parties within the international system. Nonetheless testing the effectiveness of this approach in the context of a crisis which divides one of the parties (the Gulf in our case) remains problematic. The paper tries to probe this issue, and reveal the limitations of the interdependence model in this context. It similarly attempts to test the impact of the Gulf Crisis on a European Sub Policy towards the Gulf by analyzing the behaviours of the main actors in the EU (Germany, France, and- despite brexit- the UK).

Eastern Sudan is in a critical stage, where local fault lines intersect with Horn of Africa tensions and regional and international ambitions. This study traces those fissures and their intersections in order to understand and analyze the conflict in the region. Its basic premise is that eastern Sudan represents the priority and geographical entry point in the Sudanese peace-building process, and that the establishment/strengthening of peace in this region is linked to a reciprocal relationship with the security and stability of the Horn of Africa. The study presents preliminary ideas, in terms of preventive diplomacy, that may contribute to healing the rifts. It is based on a combination of primary sources, literature, and personal interviews with Sudanese academics, diplomats and other actors. In addition, it builds on the outputs of two workshops from the Sudan Track II Peace Dialogue Project. It frames some aspects of the analysis and ideas presented with a set of theories and hypotheses that intersect with the field of conflict studies, following the "combined approach," for studying complex conflict environments.

Transboundary rivers have been a source of increasing disputes due to growing populations and economies, as well as the consequences of environmental change. With the increase in river flow utilization, concerns about potential violent interstate conflicts have arisen in public debates. However, academic literature argues for more nuanced and evidence-based views of transboundary water conflicts and proposes problem-solving tools based on water diplomacy and cooperation. Using the Eastern Nile conflict as a case study, this paper identifies eight common misconceptions regarding the conflict surrounding the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The paper contextualizes the GERD conflict within the broader transformation of river utilization towards greater competition for water use. The ongoing Eastern Nile conflict goes beyond technical affairs related to the dam operations and involves broader issues of rights to water use, national development, and climate variability and change. It is also embedded in complex regional hydro-politics that involves new actors. Recent academic evidence shows that Eastern Nile riparian countries (Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) face unique negotiating realities and diverse environmental impacts as a result of the GERD conflict. The Eastern Nile conflict presents an opportunity to facilitate benefit-sharing in the Nile Basin. Water cooperation remains the only realistic option to resolve transboundary water conflicts in the region.

Beginning in 1995, Qatar underwent a major transformation in its foreign policy, adopting an independent and neutral foreign policy as a result of being located in an important vital, geopolitical and economic region, with tensions between the influential regional powers. Given the importance of mediation in resolving disputes and bringing peace to a region raging in conflict, Qatar adopted a foreign policy approach of dialogue, good offices, mediation, and preventive diplomacy, and worked to settle disputes and crises peacefully, remaining impartial and independent, in accordance with the provisions of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. This study explores Qatar policy and experience in mediation and dispute settlement and highlights its active role and contribution over the past twenty years, by clarifying the features of its foreign policy, strategy, and principles, and highlighting case studies of previous Qatari mediation.

Following the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last August, Iranian-American relations now appear set for a major breakthrough, overturning more than three decades of enmity between the two sides. Such a breakthrough, should it come to pass, has the potential to completely transform the bilateral relations over a number of issues, including most importantly the Iranian nuclear program, Iran’s regional role and its involvement in the Middle East’s “hot button” issues, including in the Gulf. The eventual success of efforts to bring Iran and the United States closer together, however, relies also on the roles played by regional players, particularly Israel. This paper explores the reasons behind Israeli anxiety surrounding a potential breakthrough in Iranian-American relations, and Tel Aviv’s ability to influence the outcome of a possible agreement over Iran’s nuclear program and whether such an agreement shall extend to Iran’s regional influence.

The paper studies the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, from a geopolitical perspective. It argues that this conflict has historical and political roots, not solely tied to the natural availability of water in the Tigris and Euphrates, but rather connected to the policies of different parties in managing water resources. The paper includes three essential elements. The first examines the geographical and hydrological characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates. The second explores the political and academic discourse in the 1990 s regarding the "water war" theory. The third and final element analysed the characteristics of the new conditions that have distinguished the three countries since the beginning of this century, imposing on Syria and Iraq the need to devise a new vision for managing their available water resources. The research concludes with the inevitability of negotiation for the joint management of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources as it is not in Turkey's interest to ignore the interests of downstream countries. Moreover, Syria and Iraq cannot achieve any results without negotiation and water diplomacy.

An increasing number of countries are turning to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve their water disputes. This is a positive development, as it allows the court to establish and improve standards for the use of waterways and help resolve conflicts related to water. The court's decisions reflect the tension between sovereignty and international law. Some decisions prioritize sovereignty and treaties, while others give more weight to moral principles and social theories. However, the court chose not to address water as a human right. This paper focuses on the ICJ''s role in developing a body of international water law and argues that the court still values sovereignty in its interpretation of laws, which often limits protections for the rights of non-state groups.

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.