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The results of the June 15, 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey have taken observers by surprise. While pollsters had predicted that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be less popular than in earlier elections, most predictions had given the AKP 290 seats in the country’s legislature, the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”. In other words, most had predicted that the AKP would continue to command an outright majority. In the end however, the AKP won 41% of the ballots cast, equating to 258 of the total of 550 seats available in the Turkish parliament. This surprise was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party had finally crossed the 10% threshold of the popular vote to enter the chamber, and in fact secured 80 seats by winning 13% of the vote.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

In his paper Yilmaz reviews the main events since Turkey’s June 2015 elections prior to the rerun in November, the main results of the elections, the factors behind the result, and the implications of this for Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

The spark of Arab protests reached Morocco by means of the February 20 movement. The protests would probably have developed further were it not for the pre-emptive maneuver of the king in proposing constitutional amendments and in quickly passing legislation. Although the Justice and Development Party (PJD) did not back the movement, it was the main beneficiary of it, in that it won the elections with unprecedented support that enabled it to lead the government in prime political and constitutional conditions under the slogan "reform with continuity". While it might be premature to judge whether the experience has been a success or a failure, given that the PJD government is still in its early days, the preliminary assessment makes clear that the PJD has not, until now, pushed to bring about basic institutional reforms that would drive progress in various sectors. It seems that the logic of continuity has outweighed the logic of reform, or has restricted reforms as far as possible. The government may continue despite its limited achievements, but if matters remain as they are, the Islamist-oriented PJD will lose a lot of the goodwill it has gained, just as happened with other experiences of political parties in Morocco.

​The political game in Morocco has set rules and the royal institution plays a central role in its use of an approach that seeks to maintain the main political balance through soft guidance. The royal institution employs several strategies ranging from progressive integration to the implementation of restrictions, policies of repression, and use of torture as well as ignoring, feigning indifference, and taking a variety of other positions that skirt direct interference, which would cause the regime to appear authoritarian. This approach often leads to resolving outstanding problems instead of implementing threats. The paper argues that the political formula has enabled the Justice and Development Party to engage in the political arena on a practical level. The Islamists’ daily dealings with a complex reality, with all its problems and complications, have forced them to look for solutions with political officials either through consensus and coordination or by presenting their concerns to the parliament as an opposition party. This contributed a great deal to maturing and developing the party’s political experience despite the challenges posed by the parameters of the political game and the narrow margins it leaves for maneuvering.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

This study attempts to understand the concepts of democratic consolidation and of dictatorship, and explains which is closer to coming about in the Turkish state after the experience of the past sixty years. Despite the reforms undertaken by the AKP since it came to power in 2002 that aimed to curtail the constitutional and legal pretexts allowing the military to intervene in political life, there have been notable changes in the Turkish scene, especially in 2013 and 2014. It has been implied that Turkey is on course to consolidate dictatorship, and this makes the third and final phase of democratization in Turkey subject to very different assessments. On this basis, the study attempts to answer a key question: where is Turkey heading, towards democratic consolidation or towards dictatorship?

Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP) victory in the 2015 Turkish municipal elections was generally expected, the percentage of votes surprised many, including the leaders of the party. This paper suggests that, despite the best efforts of opposition parties to manipulate a series of crises for the AKP, the voters were able to see past the political maneuvering and took action at the ballot box. By first examining the many factors that had been expected to impact the results, not least of which was its political timing, and the general sense that Turkey’s ruling party was set for victory, this paper explores the political situation in Turkey at the time of the elections, and probes the events leading up to the vote. It begins with events of the year prior, which had witnessed a series of crises for the AKP including: events in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, a series of leaked voice recordings that put leaders in compromising positions, allegations of corruption against some AKP ministers, and most importantly, an ongoing conflict between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his former ally and leader of the Gulen (Service) movement Fethullah Gülen. Each of these was expected to affect the AKP’s chances of maintaining a strong political position, and was used by the ruling party to bolster its own stance; a tactic that ultimately failed.

Early in the transitional justice process during and after the Tunisian revolution, the need arose to develop a full-fledged legal framework guaranteeing the rights of victims and, at the same time, of perpetrators. However, no sooner was transitional justice legislation ratified than progress towards the objective faltered. In an atmosphere of partisan political turbulence, the legislation resulted in weak outcomes. This led to the conclusion that the foremost problem of transitional justice does not lie in an absence of political will as much as in the philosophy on which it is founded. This philosophy adheres to liberal democratic values in facing the painful past and restoring rights to victims of despotism – by stipulating a set of rights that put the victim and the executioner on the same footing, without the slightest consideration of the balance of power between them. Consequently, perpetrators and torturers tend to dodge justice and recognition of truth, equating reconciliation with accountability.

This paper explores the Moroccan municipal elections held in September, 2015. The results of the elections give an indication of the strength of the Islamist Justice and Development Party which has dominated the government since their victory in the legislative elections of 2011.