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Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

The youth revolution in Yemen at the beginning of 2011 kindled a ray of hope that the walls of tyranny could be broken down and the country could be pulled back from the clutches of narrowly defined identities. It sharpened the will that formed a “historical bloc” capable of rendering democratic transition successful. However, the youth revolution never transcended the ecstasy of a romantic revolutionary act to reach the stage of building institutions capable of enforcing respect for the law and accommodating ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political pluralism. This study addresses the impact of the Saudi-Iranian role on Yemen's transition. It is premised on considerable importance attached regional factors, which perhaps have even greater influence than domestic factors on the outcome of the Yemeni revolution. The study stresses that the effects and limits of regional factors are related to several variables, such as the vicissitudes of international politics; international and regional balances and interests; as well as the strategic location of the country subject to interference; its resources; its internal dynamics; the maturity of local elites; the weight of political opposition; and the quality of institutions.

External influence has played a central role in the Yemeni conflict. Powers seeking to extend power and establish dominance have manipulated Yemen’s diversity as a way to gain influence. Other powers seem to be using Yemen as a way to step into regional power vacuums. At the same time, diplomatic activity has been used as a way to maintain interests and sustain polar uniqueness. Each of these areas of influence are key to understanding the current conflict and for determining a path ahead. This paper examines these avenues and specifically looks at key developments leading up to the current conflict. These include the six wars waged by Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthis, the political game shifts in Yemen, the weakening of the state and other factors that led to the take-over Yemen’s capital city of Sanaa.

With the expansion of donor entities and the growth of their various activities, the questions about foreign aid and the strategic objectives behind it have become essential. This paper asks the following questions: Why do donor entities provide aid to poor countries? What are the most important objectives of these donors? Are humanitarian motives the main factor determining the conduct of donors? Theoretical and empirical studies have addressed these questions in depth from various theoretical backgrounds looking at many areas of the world, but there remains no agreement regarding the most important motives and objectives governing the conduct of donor countries in providing aid to poor countries. This paper seeks to answer these questions by reviewing, analyzing, and adapting the most important studies in international development and international relations to highlight the most important features of the global debate on this issue.

The contemporary Yemeni state is characterized by strife and complications involving all aspects of the state and society. These complexities go back to the era of its inception and continue today, leaving serious implications for the political, geographic and social unity of Yemen. There are very clear intersections between the internal (political, economic, social) and external components, which contribute to the sustained crisis in the Yemeni state. Successive Yemeni governments have failed to fulfill their assumed duties and functions, thus preventing them from dealing with all kinds of foreign interventions. Moreover, tribal and sectarian roles in Yemen have historically prevailed over other Yemeni political roles, which have not succeeded in transferring Yemen to civil rule. Nor have they managed to build a democratic model that achieves stability and allows Yemenis to participate actively in the political and economic process, consolidate the concepts of citizenship and the rule of law, and safeguard the various rights and freedoms of all members of Yemeni society.

This paper explores the roots and developments of the rivalry between the Houthis and the Salafis, based on the recent Houthi blockade and armed attack on Dammaj town in Saada governorate in north Yemen. Illustrated by the author is a sectarian map of the region and its three components: the dominant Zaidi sect and the two emerging sects in the region—Houthis and Salafis. The paper also sheds light on the historical circumstances that bred the status quo and tackles the Yemeni government’s sectarian manipulation during the rule of deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This led to the militarization of the region and turned it into a hot spot. The paper also describes the stance of the current government vis-à-vis the violence in Saada, and notes how its negative reaction could result in the expansion of strife in Yemen and could push the country into a civil war.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

A convergence of interests between the Houthi militia and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh have served to undermine the National Dialogue for the country, which had earlier formed an implementation mechanism for the GCC Initiative. Previously, the aims of that Dialogue were intended to further the cause of a federalist, democratic state which decentralized power. This would have changed the status quo, in which power was concentrated in what Yemenis call the “Holy Center”, a tribalist-sectarian concentration of political and financial power which been in place for a millennium and which survived into the reborn, unified and modern-day Yemen of 1994.

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict during 28/2/2015-30/4/2016.

It is not easy to talk about the future of the Houthi movement given the current circumstances in Yemen. The facts on the ground are changing rapidly, making it difficult to predict the course of events and the future of the actors. Making things more difficult is the complexity of the landscape, the opposing agendas of internal and external actors, and the nature of the Houthi movement itself, which has mysterious objectives and organizational structure as well as limited experience and secret internal and external alliances. Accordingly, what can be said about the future of the Houthi movement cannot go much beyond theoretical opinions, whose conclusions could change as a result of events that are not taken into account. Therefore, this paper will develop scenarios that could benefit future studies where the level of certainty is very low. This approach gives us the ability to forecast the future with a high level of coherence within the prevailing conditions, despite some apparent contradictions.