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This paper examines the 2012 General National Congress (GNC) elections in Libya, analyzing their implications and the interpretations that framed them as a victory for the liberal bloc (the National Forces Alliance) over the Islamist faction (the Justice and Construction Party and its allies). The paper reveals that this interpretation lacks accuracy, highlighting that a significant number of winning independent candidates were affiliated with Islamist movements. It also argues that Islamists later succeeded in consolidating their control within the GNC, leveraging their alliances to pass laws that excluded their political opponents. These elections marked a turning point in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi, representing the country's first democratic experiment in building a new political system despite the challenges inherited from the previous era. The paper examines the electoral system, key competitors, election results, and internal conflicts within the GNC, concluding that Islamist dominance after 2012 challenges the idea of a liberal victory.

Examining the path of the Libyan revolution from its beginning in February 17, 2011 until today, this paper goes on to forecast the challenges that Libya will likely face in the future. It examines possible scenarios of the political future of Libya. In this context, the paper focusses on the transitional stage in Libya as the transitional national council set it in the constitutional declaration on August 3, 2011. It does this in order to show the most prominent obstacles that the revolution faced and the eternal instability that the political scene in Libya has witnessed since the fall of the last regime. More broadly, this paper studies the new political map in Libya and the main actors after the fall of Gadhafi.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

​This study is about the state-building impasse in the Arab World in General, and in Libya in particular. These states have suffered, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, from lack of political prospects, eruptions of civil wars, and obstacles of political settlements among different actors in the public space. These elements have inhibited the achievement of state building, the formation of a pluralist political system and the realization of an integrated national identity. This study endeavors to analyze the obstacles that have obstructed state-building in Libya until now. It focuses on tribalism and regionalism as main obstacles to that process. In addition, it analyzes the role of external factors and actors in the light of tribalism and regionalism. It argues that state-building in Libya has stumbled and has not followed a gradual path of modern state-building and formation, and it has not gone through the necessary stages of political transition. The former has trapped Libya within narrow loyalties which are short of the wider loyalties necessary for the national state.

The Gulf states, as a center for oil and gas production, face the challenge of adapting to an increasingly uncertain energy landscape as new resources arrive in the market, and the reverberations of unstable demand and turbulent geostrategic conditions. The great challenge for these countries, in which social peace depends on unlimited consumption of subsidized energy, is to reduce consumption and develop alternative energy sources to conserve traditional fuels for export. The effects of these transformations are significant today, and the economic, social and political stability of these countries, as well as their ability to remain major players in the global energy system is at stake. Renewable energy policies, tailored to the unique political, economic and social conditions of each country, need to translate aspirations into swift practical action to succeed and rejuvenate the option of cooperation within a productive institutional framework.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

The paper investigates and analyzes the regional and international interactions with the conflict in Libya, focusing on the period following the December 2015 political agreement in Skhirat, Morocco. The paper argues that this agreement is the result of a limited consensus among domestic and regional forces. These forces have moulded their foreign policies, over the course of the conflict, based on a balance between concerns over the political and economic effects of the Libyan democratic transition and their interests and ambitions for greater control and influence. The conflict of interests between the external forces was a substantial factor along with other internal determinants that have contributed to obstructing the democratic transition process. Therefore, this paper explores a series of research questions, mainly focusing on the role and behavior of the influential external forces in Libya's domestic politics.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?