Latest Articles

International alliances, cooperation, and coordination are no longer limited to state bodies or international organizations; criminal and terrorist groups working in organized crime have also formed international networks in order to develop activities, implement plans, and achieve objectives. Despite the differences in structure and purpose between terrorist networks and criminal groups, converging interests have led to cooperation and mutual coordination. This increases the strength of both and makes it hard for authorities to control and define them. North Africa is a living example of these alliances, particularly around drug trafficking given the geographic characteristics of the region that spans Asia, Africa, and Europe. This means North Africa is a key route for drugs smuggled from around the world to Europe in particular. It is also a strategic region for terrorist groups, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in particular. With drug networks in need of protection to secure safe passage of goods, and terrorist groups’ need for sufficient funds to finance and implement plans; the region has witnessed a dangerous alliance between the two parties. This alliance has created a major challenge for countries in the region, which have been forced to confront a double threat. This treat necessitates the development of new strategies.

In 2015, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a massive contentious movement, known as "You Stink", in response to the unfolding of the waste crisis when the main landfill known as "Naameh" was closed. Though other opposition movements preceded it in the post-war period, "You Stink" succeeded in positioning itself as a threat to the continuity in power of the informal pillars of political power- the "politically relevant elites". Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify first those who are influential in framing national political agendas, hence targeted by the movement itself. Second, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key activists within "You Stink", the paper provides an exploratory analysis of the zu'ama's receptivity to it, unpacking the strategies employed to neutralize the movement. It concludes that in addition to obstructive strategies put into play by the zu'ama, certain operative caveats within the movement itself, acted as "political opportunities" to the former's capacity to neutralize and weaken the movement.

Interest Iranian foreign policy in Africa could be treat back to the sixties of the last twentieth century, when African states attained their independence.