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Israel is following the strategic changes in the region arising from the Arab revolutions with great anxiety. It is aware that its chances to control the process of change underway, and all the changes arising from it, are limited. Despite this, it is trying its utmost to minimize the negative effects of these changes on its standing in the region. This article deals with Israeli positions towards these geostrategic changes, foremost among them the fall of a number of dictatorial regimes, some of which Israel relied upon to guarantee its security. The establishment of democratic regimes in a number of Arab states threatens to disrupt the balance that was tipped in favor of Israel's security. Examined in this study is the decline of American influence in the Arab region, the prospect of change in Israeli-American relations, as well as the possibility of Israel losing its monopoly over non-conventional weapons because of the Arab Spring. To conclude, a review of the Israeli position on the revolution in Syria is also offered.

This paper presents the findings of a number of public opinion polls surrounding public attitudes towards the Palestinian Cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author focuses on three distinct themes/questions: Do respondents believe that the Palestinian Cause concerns all Arabs, or merely the Palestinians themselves? The second theme concerns Arab public opinion towards the peace treaties signed by the Arab states and Israel. The third theme covers Arab public support for, and opposition, the official recognition of Israel by their governments. The results show a wide-reaching and deep consensus across the countries surveyed in support of pan-Arab solidarity with the Palestinians, and in opposition to official recognition of Israel by their governments. The Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel was the most accepted such agreement, supported by 27% of the aggregate respondents, contributed to by 44% of Egyptians, and opposed by 54%.

This paper monitors the post-2007 trends of US foreign policy towards the Gaza Strip. This paper's discussion first examines the general framework of the US approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict before discussing the quandary posed by the Gaza Strip to that framework. The paper then focuses on the role played by President George W. Bush's administration in creating the impasse over Gaza, deconstructs the efforts to overthrow Hamas, and tracks the attempts to isolate and marginalize the Gaza Strip. Finally, it analyses the status of the Gaza Strip in the respective administrations of US presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The paper concludes that the Gaza Strip represents a predicament to both the US and Israel, to a large extent the outcome of flawed and biased US policies as well as symptomatic of the Zionist project in occupied Palestine; an outcome that cannot justify the crushing crisis caused by the official Egyptian blockade on the Gaza Strip.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

This paper examines the implications of Egypt’s military coup on Gaza and its ruling party Hamas. This study is undertaken in light of the escalation of Egyptian media incitement against Hamas and the Palestinians, including accusations that the movement was involved in violent acts on Egyptian soil during the January 2011 Revolution. These rumored actions are paralleled with apparent recent involvement of Hamas in the “terrorist” attacks in the Sinai. Since media incitement has resulted in the tightening of an Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and the destruction of tunnels that represented the lifeline of people in the coastal enclave, a full investigation of the allegations is critical.​

​This study traces the evolution of the sporting boycott of Israel from its inception and its impact on the colonial system of Israeli apartheid. It contextualises the development of this boycott in major international sports tournaments over the past decade, and how the outbreak of the Arab revolutions in late 2010 gave additional impetus to Arab youth to boycott Israel and sports in particular. Their boycott went hand in hand with their demands to end tyranny and autocracy, giving Arab athletes an opportunity to transform major international sports tournaments into a space for political action. The paper argues that the sporting boycott of Israel emerged in the last decade as a political tool for athletes and assesses the impact of this campaign in international sports tournaments on Israel's international reputation, its sports brand, and its diplomatic efforts related to marketing its emerging sports entrepreneurship.

The paper provides indications and analysis of the positions of the most influential Shia powers and parties in Iraq after the fall of the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul and the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014. In addition to the Najaf-based supreme Shia religious authority led by ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shia parties represented in government since 2003, the paper shed light on the increasingly powerful Iran-backed armed groups Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) and how their appeal, visibility and influence had changed after the fall of Mosul. The question of the Iraqi national identity and how it interacts with the Shia identity is addressed in the paper in light of the discourse of the Shia powers and relations between Shia Iraqis and other communities.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

Although foreign policy issues were not among the most conspicuous slogans adopted by the protesters during the revolution, Egyptian foreign relations are thought to be one of the areas that will be affected by the revolution. For example, the election of a civilian, popularly elected, leadership to office will certainly affect Egyptian foreign policy, a policy that has been ruled by the Camp David Agreement and the nature of the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak for decades. The paper finds a direct correlation between the structural changes taking place within the internal structure of the political system as a result of the revolution and the policies and actions the government adopts outside its national borders. To show this, the paper answers questions like: how does the revolution as a local variable affect the foreign policies of a state that undergoes a revolution? Will the soul of the Egyptian revolution be genuinely reflected in Egyptian foreign policy after the election of a new president and the transition to civilian rule? Did the actions and policies adopted by the Egyptian leadership under the presidency of Mohamed Morsi express a real change in Egyptian foreign policy? And finally, what are the challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy after the revolution?