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The referendum on the new Moroccan constitution in July 2011, which varied readings and perspectives around it, between supporters of the methodology and implications brought as necessary step towards democracy.

The Moroccan February 20 protest movement came with the mobilization of the Moroccan street through peaceful demonstrations demanding constitutional reforms in the framework of a parliamentary monarchy. The king, keen not to replicate what happened in neighboring states, could not ignore the February 20 movement. This pushed him to announce the program for constitutional reform in his speech on March 9, 2011. The strategy of the political regime to contain and defuse the February 20 movement led every initiative, including the project for the 2011 constitution, to become a resource and weapon in the hands of the authorities, and means for the symbolic and material suppression of the February 20 movement. The constitutional referendum of July 1, 2012, which was backed by the people, and which February 20 called to boycott, represented the beginning of the rapid demise of the movement, because it reinforced the legitimacy of reform, and hence the monarchy. The February 20 Movement represents an opportunity to rethink the meaning of opposition in Morocco, particularly when set against analysis formulated in the 1970s by pioneers such as John Waterbury and Rémy Leveau, who concluded that the opposition, despite its differences and variety of protests, served in the end to reproduce the existing political regime.

The Gulf Crises and Blockade of Qatar: Economic, Legal and Political Perspective

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.

Several scholars studying the so-called authoritarian elections argue that the primary motivation for citizens to vote in the Arab world is the pursuit of individual (mostly material) interests driven by clientelism that may take the form of explicit vote-buying or granting services and privileges to electors. However, research overlooked the potential impact of citizens' evaluation of the regime's democratic level on electoral participation. The goal of this study is to fill this gap. The analysis of the eighth round of the Arab Opinion Index (2022) across nine Arab countries—Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania— reveals that individuals who perceive their country as more democratic are more likely to vote, regardless of objective indicators suggesting the undemocratic nature of the political system.

This study problematises the theoretical dialectic between the rule of law as a formal legal principle, and democracy as a political value. Taking a fundamental legal approach, the paper builds a concept of a constitutionalization democratic rule of law, through which it is possible to overcome the constant tension in democracy between the authority of the majority in deciding the law, and individual rights and freedoms. It concludes that the rule of law does not mean the rule of law over individual rights, and democracy does not mean the rule of the majority only, but that respect for individual rights and granting them a constitutional value are a prerequisite for constitutionalizing the principle of a democratic rule of law. However, the application of this principle, in practice, will be linked to the role of the constitutional judge in reconciling, through constitutional oversight, the power of the majority, which is embodied in the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional rights, which are the essence of the democratic principle.

The study aims to investigating the matter of constructing a statistical index to measure the level of political culture in the Arab countries, based on methodological triangulation; that is, using more than one tool to identify the characteristics of political culture and its component elements, as well as collecting and classifying data and determining the optimal statistical method to calculate the sub-indices with a focus on quantitative measurement. Depending on the results of the exploratory study, the level of the political culture indicators in concerning the cognitive and affective dimensions is slightly below average (50 points out of 100), which is an encouraging outcome in a context characterized by low educational level and rural concentration. On the other hand, the political culture index concerning the evaluative dimension recorded a rather low score (37 points out of 100), reflecting an insufficiency of interest in making judgments and attitudes towards political institutions and issues in the community study.

The concept of soft power continues to receive significant attention from researchers, relevant actors in the international community, and small and rising powers alike. This paper discusses the nature of soft power, how it works, how it can be employed, its effectiveness, and its limits. It critically engages with the existing literature on soft power and argues that soft power does not exist by itself, but rather is made. Accordingly, soft power is not just a strategy as is the case with smart power, nor it can be purchased in its raw form, as is the case with hard power, and it is not of unilateral negative nature, as is the case with sharp power. The paper asserts the need to distinguish between sources of soft power and its tools. It contends that soft power resources can be mobilized and directed towards the target using soft power tools. The paper aims to contribute to discussion of what soft power is and how it works; thus, it offers a theoretical framework on the working mechanism of soft power that takes into account using soft power against non-democratic systems: autocracy, totalitarian, or theocracy.

This is the second section of a study examining the application of good governance in Egypt and Tunisia. The first section, published in issue 42 of the Siyasat Arabiya journal, provided an in-depth theoretical framework for assessing the dynamics of administering governmental affairs, establishing the prerequisites of effective governance, and combatting corruption. This second section argues that administrative corruption is an important obstacle to the quality of public services provided by central government in Egypt and Tunisia, despite various laws and codes calling for tackling corruption and corrupt individuals. This study recommends governmental decentralization; gradually permitting legislative bodies to review the work mechanisms of public administration; adopting organizational philosophies that can serve to improve the process of providing public services; and finally, activating e-government and information and communications technology to achieve more effective public administration operations and services provision and thereby contribute to expanding economic growth.

Examined in this article are a number of aspects of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, specifically, the relationship between the presidency and the parliament; the status of the newly created constitutional court; the higher judicial council; constitutional controls and restrictions; the role of religion and the status of women in the new constitution; and administrative decentralization within the constitution. Adopting a comparative approach, the author examines each of these topics in their proper regional and historical context. This allows for a clearer understanding of what factors have allowed Tunisia's constitutional politics to advance so quickly when compared to other states in the region. Through successful dialogue, the Tunisian people were able to prove that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to conflict or stagnation. The author further argues that the pragmatic approach of Tunisian parties to the national dialogue provided a model of conflict resolution to be emulated across the globe.