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One year has passed since the start of coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. Over that year ISIL has endured setbacks and defeats in a number of areas, perhaps the most important of which are Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasaka. However, it succeeded in expanding its influence and incorporated new towns and villages such as Tadmur, the eastern Rif Homs, northern Rif Aleppo, Qalamon, and the Yarmouk refugee camp in the capital into its “state”. In this way it cut up the majority of Syrian territory and threatened strategic centers and urban areas such as Homs and the capital Damascus. The paper concludes that ISIL is imposing the rhythm and variables of battle in various parts of Syria. The international coalition remains unable to eliminate it or degrade it in the short or medium term. Eliminating ISIL may take years if the piecemeal US approach to confronting it continues as now.

Beginning with a look at Tunisia’s current coalition government, formed by Habib Essid, this paper discusses the challenges that this government faces going forward. It will examine issues of security, economic and social issues, terrorist organizations and organized crime; each of which threaten Tunisia’s prospects for peace and democracy in the post-revolution period. While the new government won a comfortable majority unprecedented among post-revolution governments, some actors believe the composition of this government has not taken into account the marginal and deprived regions of the country, and is more inclined to centralize power in favor of coastal regions or the capital city. This paper argues a different view, however, and suggests that Essid is more concerned with establishing pluralism and gaining the most supporters in the parliament in order to pass a test of confidence. The paper also argues that the composition of the new government was based on a broad pluralistic political/ technocratic coalition that combined secularists, Islamists and non-partisans; characterized by the neutralization of most sovereign ministries.

This paper’s primary argument is that Netanyahu’s fourth term as Prime Minister will see him lead a cabinet which will as yet be his most extreme and the most antagonistic towards the Palestinians. Its sole aim will be the expansion of the settlement enterprise and to oppress the Palestinians, both within the occupied Palestinian Territories and behind the Green Line (the 1949 Demarcation Line), in a bid to push them to surrender. To illustrate this argument, the paper presents a survey of the rightwing groups which form a part of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition. The paper further explores the draft legislation which form the basis for the new ruling coalition before offering a conclusion which attempts to forecast what the future will look like under a fourth Netanyahu cabinet.

ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly

This study raises several pressing questions: Was the fall of the Salvation Regime in Sudan the result of an internal initiative or the opposition coalition, or both? To what extent did external dynamics influence the overthrow of regime and the transition to democracy? Is the post-Salvation regime likely to follow a democratic trajectory, or will it turn into another authoritarian regime? The study concludes that it is likely that the agreed goal between the international powers and their authoritarian partners in the region is to move Sudan to a "hybrid" system, where the elements of the old authoritarian regime remain in power, while maintaining a minimum level of democracy. In addition, the ruling military-civilian coalition will find support from the United States and the European Union (and their regional allies), enabling it to dismantle the institutions of the former regime, accommodate a number of armed movements in the political process, and gradually integrate into the international (security and economic) system. Meanwhile, domestically, the transitional government will face challenges that may not only lead to the collapse of the transitional process, but also to the collapse of the Sudanese state itself.

In September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced a “comprehensive strategy” to degrade and destroy ISIL. Obama stated, “I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” But despite this announcement, questions over the nature, goals, and instruments of US policy towards ISIL still continue to be asked in the context of a debate between those who think that the US is not doing enough to take on ISIL and those who think it would be better for the US not to expand its military involvement in the conflict. This debate has been influenced by internal American political polarizations in the form of the critical position taken by leading Republicans such as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who view the Obama policy as weak, and Middle Eastern regional rivalries over the position towards ISIL and the nature of the political choices that must frame the confrontation with it.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

Morocco's participation in the Saudi-led coalition was formed to confront the expansion of Houthi rebel control over the Yemeni state. This study gives an overview of the factors that led to the expansion of the geopolitical and geostrategic depth of the Gulf States to include a number of Arab countries, all the way to the Kingdom of Morocco. The paper discusses the gains Morocco made as a result of joining Operation Decisive Storm. Morocco faces similar challenges from extremist groups, making participation in the operation an opportunity it can benefit from later in the event it needs to tackle similar militias in the Sahara. In addition to the economic and political reasons for joining the coalition, the geostrategic shifts in the Arab region and the rise of the threat of extremist ideological forces in the region has prompted Morocco and the Gulf States to develop a new vision for relations on the basis of cross-border national security. The paper finally tackles the shift Morocco's participation has represented, examining King Mohammed VI's preference for more rapprochement with the European neighborhood.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

This research tried to explore different stages of the Zionist "penetration" of British political circles, and to identify the strategies and tactics, which were employed by the "Zionist lobby" organisations in order to win over the British public. The focus of this research was on the Zionist lobby organisations’ methods in Britain, where pro-Israel organisations run "soft" and "hard" pressure tools including publicity, propaganda, direct advertising, editorial advertising, public relations, and funding, to influence the attitude of the British public. The research found that the the pro-Israel lobby had intensified its activities in the last decade, to counter a British public opinion that appeared to have become more sympathetic and understanding of the Palestinian narrative.