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​For centuries, Arabs and Kurds have shared not only the same geographical space, but also the same cultural sphere. Even during periods of heighten awareness of their ethnic differences, it would have been impossible to speak of anything approaching a “Kurdish Question” within the Arab world prior the twentieth century and the advent—and global spread—of the nation-state model born in the 19th century, which, in its Middle Eastern variant, was always rooted in ethnicity. This was complicated by the need of the emergent nation-states to absorb and integrate nascent political identities born of these ethnic groups.

Victimization narratives compose a principle element in creating of sub-national identities in societies afflicted by divisions and communal disputes. Little wonder then that narratives of victimization abound in Kirkuk province, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s “disputed internal areas” problem. This paper starts of by analyzing the nature of victimization narratives and how they make use of the past to serve political projects spearheaded by political elites. It then turns to surveying and deconstructing the contending narratives propagated by communal elites in Kirkuk regarding the victimization, whether real or imagined, endured by the province’s demographic components – Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Christians. By analytically surveying the narratives of victimization of these four communities, this paper seeks to ascertain the workings of these narratives and to explicate the role they play.

This paper explores the difficulties of the city and governorate of Kirkuk, specifically the problems from its diverse composition. Kirkuk has been described as a “microcosm of Iraq”, in recognition of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity in the region. This gives added impetus to finding a resolution to the difficulties of governance in the governorate-city: a solution to the problems in Kirkuk could have positive reverberations for the rest of Iraq.The governorate’s problems began in the wake of the discovery of oil there, with a gradual effort towards “Arabization” of the population there undertaken by the then-government of Saddam. This led to the formation of clear ethnic fault lines, which became clearer following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that point, Kirkuk became even more polarized, serving to further entrench the problems of governance in the region. Based on the existing literature on Kirkuk, on the Iraqi constitution and the experience of government in Iraq since 2003, this paper proposes consociational democracy as the preferred approach to resolving Kirkuk’s long-outstanding issues, including the disputes resulting from religious and ethnic differences typical of pluralist societies.

​For centuries, Arabs and Kurds have shared not only the same geographical space, but also the same cultural sphere. Even during periods of heighten awareness of their ethnic differences, it would have been impossible to speak of anything approaching a “Kurdish Question” within the Arab world prior the twentieth century and the advent—and global spread—of the nation-state model born in the 19th century, which, in its Middle Eastern variant, was always rooted in ethnicity. This was complicated by the need of the emergent nation-states to absorb and integrate nascent political identities born of these ethnic groups.

The war against ISIL is a critical US national security interest. It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but could become a major center of international terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that ISIL is only one cause of instability in the region, and only one of the threats caused by spreading sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq is a key case in point. No defeat of ISIL can bring Iraq security or stability, or give it the unity and independent strength to resist pressure from Iran and threats based in Syria and Turkey. No military course of action can—by itself – create a stable regime and economy, and reduce tension between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, and Arabs and Kurds, to workable levels. Like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, military action must be joined to political and economic action and the creation of some form of viable governance.