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This study problematises the theoretical dialectic between the rule of law as a formal legal principle, and democracy as a political value. Taking a fundamental legal approach, the paper builds a concept of a constitutionalization democratic rule of law, through which it is possible to overcome the constant tension in democracy between the authority of the majority in deciding the law, and individual rights and freedoms. It concludes that the rule of law does not mean the rule of law over individual rights, and democracy does not mean the rule of the majority only, but that respect for individual rights and granting them a constitutional value are a prerequisite for constitutionalizing the principle of a democratic rule of law. However, the application of this principle, in practice, will be linked to the role of the constitutional judge in reconciling, through constitutional oversight, the power of the majority, which is embodied in the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional rights, which are the essence of the democratic principle.

What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

This study focuses on the legal status of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (PDI) issued in 1988 by the Palestinian National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in light of the Palestinian Constitutional Court 2018 decision, which granted the declaration a "supra-constitutional" status—placing it above the Basic Law issued by the Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The authors characterize the legal nature of the PDI as a "Declaration of Rights" and argue that the Court, in issuing its decision, overstepped its interpretive power, deeming the decision flawed due to the political considerations behind it, aiming at enhancing the legitimacy of the PA by invoking the symbolic legitimacy of the PLO. The study comparatively showcases experiences from the United States, France, Egypt, and Algeria, revealing that none of these jurisdictions have granted Declarations of Rights a status superior to that of the constitution. The authors conclude that the Court's decision was unsound and that the PDI should be treated as a reference constitutional document, but not one that supersedes the Basic Law.

This study addresses the intricate issues posed by the State of Palestine's legislation concerning the redefinition of the Palestinian. Despite the fact that these laws seem to be regulatory for particular situations, they propose a fragmented and different definition of that which is proposed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) charters. One of its manifestations was the controversy surrounding who the Palestinian is during the postponed general elections of 2021. This contributed to the creation of the current practical framework for the legal text that categorizes Palestinians according to where they live; allowing one group to exercise their right to self-determination and not others. It also had an impact on how the definition of two concepts—the Palestinian and the right to self-determination—were altered, and the extent to which the effects of the legislation may impact the legal basis of the PLO. The PLO enjoys an international legal personality recognized by the international community as the sole representative of all Palestinians, regardless of their place of residence.

This study examines the constitutional management of political transition in Algeria following the popular protests of February 2019 (the Hirak). After setting out the basic tenets of Transitional Constitutionalism, the study investigates the extent to which peaceful political change can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms or arrangements derived from inherited texts. In contrast to similar Arab cases, the Algerian experience was characterized by the adoption of a political plan to manage the transitional phase, based on constitutional measures derived from the texts in force. But it was not convincing for a large segment of the Hirak, who believed that these arrangements would restrict the path of change to reproduce the existing system at the expense of achieving peaceful political change. In this sense, managing the transitional political phase according to the applicable constitutional texts did not set a precedent. Rather, in Algeria, a kind of precedent was set in the restriction of the concept of constitutional solution to the literal requirements of the functional constitutional text, without partial constitutional amendments, nor a fundamental revision of the inherited legislative structure.

This article aims to explain and review the theoretical and normative contexts of Transitional Justice (TJ). This is done as empirical studies or specific settings particularly in the Arab region need to be rooted much more in TJ theory. The article argues that data and statistics need to be used and evaluated and that there needs to be greater use of methodological processes including empirical studies. It is argued that at present, this is not always the case. Similarly, when models are presented or critiqued by practitioners, little regard is given to TJ theory, or the context within which those models operated. Therefore, it is difficult to see what lessons can be learnt for other places even where the context or circumstances are very similar.

This paper examines the role of the constitution designing process in pushing the democratic transition towards cooperation, rather than conflict, in light of the great uncertainty that characterizes the democratic transition process regarding the future. The study focuses on four successful cases of democratic transition (Poland, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia) to identify the common factors that contributed to their success. Through its comparative approach, the study concludes that the process of constitution designing more socio-political than legal as it requires a great deal of bargaining and negotiations to achieve balance and harmony between the existing political and social actors. The study shows how the adoption of arrangements that limit the absolute power of the majority (counter- majoritarian measures) was one of the strategies used to assuage any fears and build confidence among the various political actors.

Examined in this article are a number of aspects of Tunisia's 2014 constitution, specifically, the relationship between the presidency and the parliament; the status of the newly created constitutional court; the higher judicial council; constitutional controls and restrictions; the role of religion and the status of women in the new constitution; and administrative decentralization within the constitution. Adopting a comparative approach, the author examines each of these topics in their proper regional and historical context. This allows for a clearer understanding of what factors have allowed Tunisia's constitutional politics to advance so quickly when compared to other states in the region. Through successful dialogue, the Tunisian people were able to prove that ideological differences do not necessarily lead to conflict or stagnation. The author further argues that the pragmatic approach of Tunisian parties to the national dialogue provided a model of conflict resolution to be emulated across the globe.

Examining the dimensions of the constitutional crisis in Libya, this paper begins by explaining the situation of the country’s political factions. On this backdrop, it looks at how the interim Constitutional Declaration of Libya’s 17 February revolution – which has seen seven amendments – has led to large-scale changes in the legal positions of political institutions and has caused a disturbance in the state’s constitutional framework. Analysis shows how the declaration has disrupted the country’s transitional path, and outlines the ways that this has taken place including: the diverse results from the National Congress’s legislative elections where no political party or movement secured an absolute majority, the growing disputes following the adoption of the political and administrative isolation law, and the emergence of alternative proposals for a third transitional period. This paper tackles the factors leading up to the amendments of the interim Constitutional Declaration, issued on August 3 2011, and their impact on Libya’s political crisis. Analyzing the constitutional framework allows a closer look into the role of Libyan political actors and an understanding of the elements that helped shape the path of the transitional period. It shows that the conflict over the constitutional framework has led to an armed conflict among parties to the Libyan revolution.