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This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

Current scholarship on elections in authoritarian regimes has focused on exploring the relationship between elections and democratization, and it has generally used analytical frameworks and methods imported from the study of genuinely democratic elections to do so. These tendencies have kept scholars from asking a wide range of questions about the micro-level dynamics of authoritarian elections and the systematic differences among them. With these issues in mind, this review examines literature that investigates the purpose of elections in dictatorships; the electoral behavior of voters, candidates, and incumbents in these elections; and the link between elections and democratization. The review ends with a call to redirect the study of authoritarian elections toward uncovering and explaining the important differences among them.

This paper examines the role of the constitution designing process in pushing the democratic transition towards cooperation, rather than conflict, in light of the great uncertainty that characterizes the democratic transition process regarding the future. The study focuses on four successful cases of democratic transition (Poland, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia) to identify the common factors that contributed to their success. Through its comparative approach, the study concludes that the process of constitution designing more socio-political than legal as it requires a great deal of bargaining and negotiations to achieve balance and harmony between the existing political and social actors. The study shows how the adoption of arrangements that limit the absolute power of the majority (counter- majoritarian measures) was one of the strategies used to assuage any fears and build confidence among the various political actors.

Scholarship explains impediments to democratic transition in Middle Eastern countries as forms of neopatrimonialism - a combination of patrimonial tradition and cosmetic electoral procedures. However, this approach conflates two spheres of governance: firstly, the government as a sphere of appointed or elected politicians, secondly, the state's bureaucracy as a sphere of administrative staff necessary for the government to execute its planned actions. The impediments Hamas governments (2006-2007) faced highlight the difference between the two spheres. Accordingly, I conceptually differentiate between two types of government: government in office and government in power. While the Hamas government was supposed to rule, the administrative personnel refused to comply. Thus, the elected government in office faced local-institutional and external constraints which prevented its functioning, and provoked power struggles that led to internecine war and the collapse of the electoral democracy.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

The study defines the "external factor" and determines its impact on the transition process. The study notes that the role of these factors in transition is different from that of "democratization" if the external influence of the revolutions is minimal. This is especially so in the case of spontaneous popular revolutions where the external factor may be influential in the democratic transition, although its impact is decisive only when accompanied by facilitating domestic factors. The study shows the relationship between the external factor and the geostrategic location of the Arab state whereby the external factor becomes more important according to the importance of the state. The study follows the evolution of the principle of supporting democracy in US politics, which has been linked to US interests and has ended up supporting regime stability. It also monitors a regional and international trend of "promoting autocracy".

This study problematises the theoretical dialectic between the rule of law as a formal legal principle, and democracy as a political value. Taking a fundamental legal approach, the paper builds a concept of a constitutionalization democratic rule of law, through which it is possible to overcome the constant tension in democracy between the authority of the majority in deciding the law, and individual rights and freedoms. It concludes that the rule of law does not mean the rule of law over individual rights, and democracy does not mean the rule of the majority only, but that respect for individual rights and granting them a constitutional value are a prerequisite for constitutionalizing the principle of a democratic rule of law. However, the application of this principle, in practice, will be linked to the role of the constitutional judge in reconciling, through constitutional oversight, the power of the majority, which is embodied in the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional rights, which are the essence of the democratic principle.

This article aims to explain and review the theoretical and normative contexts of Transitional Justice (TJ). This is done as empirical studies or specific settings particularly in the Arab region need to be rooted much more in TJ theory. The article argues that data and statistics need to be used and evaluated and that there needs to be greater use of methodological processes including empirical studies. It is argued that at present, this is not always the case. Similarly, when models are presented or critiqued by practitioners, little regard is given to TJ theory, or the context within which those models operated. Therefore, it is difficult to see what lessons can be learnt for other places even where the context or circumstances are very similar.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

The premise of this study is the belief that there is a crisis in contemporary liberal democracy resulting from the tension between two traditions: one democratic and the other liberal. The spread of right-wing populism in the West is not a new phenomenon, but rather a new manifestation of what may be called a permanent crisis of democracy. The study distinguishes populism from totalitarian ideological movements that gain popular support through demagogy and incitement against the other and reviews existing tensions in the structure of liberal democracy. The paper finds that populist rhetoric is channeled through tensions in the structure of liberal democracy and translates social anger into criticism of the democratic system itself, by using one component of a complex democratic system against another.