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The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

The paper focuses on transnational human rights activism and its efforts to influence the human rights landscape in Egypt. It argues that the global human rights system has provided a space for resisting authoritarianism in Egypt and that its significance has grown amid the widespread restrictions on civil and political rights, as well as the forced or voluntary relocation of many human rights activists and political actors into exile. The paper further reveals that the extent of the Egyptian government’s response to pressures from transnational networks is shaped by domestic, regional, and international conditions and factors—including the impact of counter- discourses and strategies that enable authoritarian regimes to contain and weaken the effects of transnational networks. The paper draws on a diverse set of primary and secondary sources, including publications from international and local human rights organizations, government statements, and media reports, in addition to semi- structured interviews with a group of Egyptian human rights defenders.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

​Many analysts and observers believe the opposition media played a critical role in ousting Morsi through their printed and television outlets, which reported against him for a whole year. This paper examines Egyptian media’s policies, starting from Morsi’s becoming president at the end of June 2012 and extending to the stage following his ouster until now. The paper lists the main strategies adopted by the media and lays out models of Egyptian media’s international coverage. It also explores the motives behind the work of some media outlets and their common traits and tries to explain why the media adopted this type of discourse. The paper also highlights the forms of provocation practiced by several Egyptian media outlets against the coup opponents and detects several rumors spread by the media and their source.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒُﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ا دوار اﻟﺘﻲ اﺿﻄﻠﻌﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ اﺟﺘﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ رﻳﺎح اﻟﺜﻮرات؛ إذ ﻧﻠﺤَﻆ أن اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺮ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺻﻄﻔﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻘﻮات ﻧﺠﺤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﻮغ ﻣﺮادﻫﺎ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻊ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺪﻋﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﺼﻤﻮد ﻓﻲ وﺟﻪ ﻗﻤﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴﺔ. إن ا دوار اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺧﺬت اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺆدﻳﻬﺎ اﻟﻴﻮم ﻻ ﺗﺆﻛﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﻴﻮش وأﻫﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ وﺣﺴْ ﺐ، وﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﺚ أﻳﻀ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺻﻼح اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان. وﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﺳﺆال إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ واﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻳﺒﺮز ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎوﺑًﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ. وﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻃﺎر، ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻣﻨﻲ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. This paper explores the military aspect of the Arab Spring, and specifically the role played by formal armies in the Arab Spring states. Specifically, this paper focuses on the fact that popular revolutions during the Arab Spring were successful in those countries in which the military sided with the protestors, whereas revolutionary momentum could not face down the regimes in those countries where the armies did not side with the revolution. The political functions which Arab armies carry out serve to highlight not only their significance and effectiveness as institutions, but also the need for military reform. The question of military and security sector reform has become increasingly pressing in the post-Arab Spring transitional phase, driving the author to probe the structural aspects of reform to the military and security sectors of the Arab Spring states.