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Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.

This study examines the constitutional management of political transition in Algeria following the popular protests of February 2019 (the Hirak). After setting out the basic tenets of Transitional Constitutionalism, the study investigates the extent to which peaceful political change can be achieved through constitutional mechanisms or arrangements derived from inherited texts. In contrast to similar Arab cases, the Algerian experience was characterized by the adoption of a political plan to manage the transitional phase, based on constitutional measures derived from the texts in force. But it was not convincing for a large segment of the Hirak, who believed that these arrangements would restrict the path of change to reproduce the existing system at the expense of achieving peaceful political change. In this sense, managing the transitional political phase according to the applicable constitutional texts did not set a precedent. Rather, in Algeria, a kind of precedent was set in the restriction of the concept of constitutional solution to the literal requirements of the functional constitutional text, without partial constitutional amendments, nor a fundamental revision of the inherited legislative structure.

Consociationalism is a system of government recommended for ‘divided societies’. Starting with a discussion of its theoretical components and criticisms it has received, this article addresses how consociationalism has been implemented in in post - 2003 Iraq. The article asks whether the Iraqi constitution and institutions formed by it represented a successful case of consociationalism. Key consociational mechanisms such as an electoral system based on proportional representation, governments based on big multi - party coalitions and a federal and decentralized governance were adopted. However, this model was not entirely consociational as some practices that are common in the majoritarian government have also been used. In fact, divisions between majoritarian and consociational perspectives have polarized, and sometimes paralyzed, the political process. In light of this, the article discusses the sustainability of the current model and its likely future trajectories.