Latest Articles

The latest report in this series covers milestones in Palestinian affairs and developments in the broader Arab-Israeli conflict between September 1 and December 30, 2017.

This testimony provides a qualitative understanding of the diversity of Kurdish positions on the Syrian revolution, and the evolution of Kurdish attitudes over the course of the revolution. The position of the Kurds, like all Syrians, was never homogenous. Within this context, the writer distinguishes three declared positions (pro-revolution, pro-regime, and observer), as well as another, hesitant position that interacts with the situation and waits. The writer concludes that Syrian Kurdish communities are now witnessing a clear distinction between two main political positions. The first is represented by the Kurdish National Council, which works within the Syrian opposition institutions. The second position is represented by the Democratic Union Party, and the parties in its orbit. This trend is a regional project that does not intersect with the Syrian national project.

This study explores the perceptions of Britain's main political parties towards the Palestinian Islamist faction Hamas throughout the period between 2003 and 2016. It explores also the extent of variation between the major political parties in the UK towards Hamas. The author argues that the lack of a value-based outlook on the part of the British ruling establishment as well as a lack of respect for the tenets of international law—which enshrines the right to resist occupation—have driven that establishment to embrace the UK's colonial legacy, and to regard their government as the founder and protector of the State of Israel. It is this establishmentarian discourse, argues the author, which drives the criminalization of Hamas within British politics.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.