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The relationship between economies and polities is one of vital importance to the outcome of the contemporary intensifying struggle between authoritarians and democrats. Investigating this relationship in Egypt is therefore of relevance for the world as a whole, increasingly divided as it is between countries with political economies informed by authoritarian or democratic models. This study will explore manifestations of that vital relationship in Egypt. It will commence by outlining the global and national contexts within which the economy operates, and both shape it and present challenges that must be met to achieve more rapid growth. How economic factors have contributed to the rise of Sisi's new authoritarianism will then be investigated. This will be followed by reversing that relationship, analyzing the economic consequences of the Sisi regime. Whether those consequences will better enable Egypt to compete economically, or will undermine its capacities to do so, is addressed in the fourth section. That is followed by an effort to answer the related question of what the key building blocks of a more successful economic strategy might be. In the conclusion scenarios of alternative futures of Egypt's political economy are considered.

The paper focuses on transnational human rights activism and its efforts to influence the human rights landscape in Egypt. It argues that the global human rights system has provided a space for resisting authoritarianism in Egypt and that its significance has grown amid the widespread restrictions on civil and political rights, as well as the forced or voluntary relocation of many human rights activists and political actors into exile. The paper further reveals that the extent of the Egyptian government’s response to pressures from transnational networks is shaped by domestic, regional, and international conditions and factors—including the impact of counter- discourses and strategies that enable authoritarian regimes to contain and weaken the effects of transnational networks. The paper draws on a diverse set of primary and secondary sources, including publications from international and local human rights organizations, government statements, and media reports, in addition to semi- structured interviews with a group of Egyptian human rights defenders.

This study begins by discussing the concept of legitimacy and then examines the patterns of legitimacy in Egypt since 2013. It specifically focuses on the legitimacy of performance within the field of educational policies and its role in the regime's continuity. The study finds that the regime cannot establish its own legitimacy merely by creating an illusion of effective performance. Instead, it can manage legitimacy through several strategies: shaping public expectations by emphasizing the importance of maintaining public order and providing basic goods and services; influencing public perceptions by highlighting achievements while concealing failures and suppressing criticism; and managing citizens' perceptions of alternatives, such as Islamist groups or a descent into chaos, or both. The study also concludes that the regime's objective is not to secure genuine popular support but to ensure general compliance by persuading the majority that it is more effective in improving their lives than any alternative. This level of legitimacy may be sufficient to encourage adherence to laws and discourage efforts to replace the regime.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

​This study explores the concept of a traditional balance of power based on realism, which, for several reasons, is unsuitable to explain the relations between the US and the Gulf States. First, competition between the main regional powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, is not characterized of direct confrontation, but rather manifests through proxy interference in civil war-torn countries (Syria, Yemen, and Iraq). Second, since the greatest threat to the region that has resulted from this competition is an unintended escalation, the final endgame must be collective security and stability, not a balance of power. Third, balance of power in the conventional sense is unrealistic given the actual quantitative and qualitative conventional military superiority of the GCC countries compared to Iran's military capacity.