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In his paper Yilmaz reviews the main events since Turkey’s June 2015 elections prior to the rerun in November, the main results of the elections, the factors behind the result, and the implications of this for Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

The results of the June 15, 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey have taken observers by surprise. While pollsters had predicted that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be less popular than in earlier elections, most predictions had given the AKP 290 seats in the country’s legislature, the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”. In other words, most had predicted that the AKP would continue to command an outright majority. In the end however, the AKP won 41% of the ballots cast, equating to 258 of the total of 550 seats available in the Turkish parliament. This surprise was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party had finally crossed the 10% threshold of the popular vote to enter the chamber, and in fact secured 80 seats by winning 13% of the vote.

This paper applies the categorization of welfare state systems set out by Esping-Andersen in 1990 to the welfare state in Egypt. It analyzes the relationships between state, market, and society over the 10 years from 1995 to 2005, which were marked by a shift to a market economy and a confrontation with the historical legacy of the state’s social role. The best description for the current welfare state in Egypt is “conservative/unorganized” in that social security entitlements are limited to work in the formal sector, which makes the family, religious institutions, and patronage networks take on important roles in meeting the social needs of the large informal sector. Additionally, the study proposes some modifications to the Esping-Andersen categorization with the aim of understanding welfare programs in developing countries. When analyzing welfare systems in general, particularly in the developing countries, it is necessary to take into account methodologically aspects of mismanagement, considerations of quality, the gap between stated aims and their implementation, the disparity resulting from differences between countryside and city and between the sexes, and the role of the informal sector.

The parliamentary experience in Morocco continues to excite the interest of politicians, researchers, academics, and those working in the press and media. This importance is heightened with the experience of the sixth parliament (1997-2002), which followed the adoption of the 1996 constitution, and which witnessed a decisive historical landmark in the form of two prominent events: the first peaceful transition of power in Morocco, and the transfer of rule from the late King Hassan II, who died on July 23, 1999, to King Mohamed VI. This experience made King Mohamed VI keen on historical continuity and the approach of the bicameral system (representative and consultative), and the rotation of power. The importance of this study derives from the relative paucity of relevant studies, and its attempt to understand this experience. This requires examining the constitutional amendments, the legislative elections and what accompanied them, as well as the outputs and successes of the practice of the parliamentary process.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?