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​This study fits into a broad category of scholarship concerned with transitional periods in various political systems. Specifically, it examines the political transition in post-revolutionary Tunisia since 2011. It does so by comparing the legal provisions of the post-revolutionary transition - the major texts, which define the transitional stage - and the political realities, which take the shape of events, actions and political discourse. A point of particular focus is the 2011 elections to the National Constituent Assembly, which the author analyzes through the rubric of "electoral engineering". One more conclusion of the paper is that electoral engineering remains a feature of Tunisian politics, although it has gone from "authoritarian electoral engineering" to "democratic electoral engineering," reflecting changes which have taken in the country as a whole.

In his paper Yilmaz reviews the main events since Turkey’s June 2015 elections prior to the rerun in November, the main results of the elections, the factors behind the result, and the implications of this for Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

The results of the June 15, 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey have taken observers by surprise. While pollsters had predicted that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be less popular than in earlier elections, most predictions had given the AKP 290 seats in the country’s legislature, the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey”. In other words, most had predicted that the AKP would continue to command an outright majority. In the end however, the AKP won 41% of the ballots cast, equating to 258 of the total of 550 seats available in the Turkish parliament. This surprise was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party had finally crossed the 10% threshold of the popular vote to enter the chamber, and in fact secured 80 seats by winning 13% of the vote.

This paper discusses what it sees as turmoil in Turkish policy towards the Syrian crisis, a policy that is marked by constant fluctuations. For example, the passive stance towards ISIL’s occupation of the Kurdish town of Ain al-Arab/Kobani stood in contradiction to Turkey’s subsequent air attacks on ISIL positions inside Syria following the explosions in Suruc, only for Turkey to then change tactic again by bombarding the rear lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. Even after Turkey opened up the Incirlik airbase to coalition forces, Turkey did not participate in the campaign against ISIL beyond a few strikes, while its air power was continuously targeting PKK positions. Turkish policy in Syria has not developed much, and is being pulled into the political crisis and acts of violence at home, which have crippled the country since the elections of June 7, 2015. In addition, the situation in Syria has forced Turkey to focus on its southern borders, putting it in contact with the various active parties in Syria with their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis has forced Ankara to reconsider its management of the Aegean coast and its northern borders, to keep refugees on its territory and so maintain good relations with the EU.

Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP) victory in the 2015 Turkish municipal elections was generally expected, the percentage of votes surprised many, including the leaders of the party. This paper suggests that, despite the best efforts of opposition parties to manipulate a series of crises for the AKP, the voters were able to see past the political maneuvering and took action at the ballot box. By first examining the many factors that had been expected to impact the results, not least of which was its political timing, and the general sense that Turkey’s ruling party was set for victory, this paper explores the political situation in Turkey at the time of the elections, and probes the events leading up to the vote. It begins with events of the year prior, which had witnessed a series of crises for the AKP including: events in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, a series of leaked voice recordings that put leaders in compromising positions, allegations of corruption against some AKP ministers, and most importantly, an ongoing conflict between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his former ally and leader of the Gulen (Service) movement Fethullah Gülen. Each of these was expected to affect the AKP’s chances of maintaining a strong political position, and was used by the ruling party to bolster its own stance; a tactic that ultimately failed.

This paper analyses the extent to which a “New Era” of the Turkish Republic is possible following the election of former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the presidency on August 10. Erdogan is the twelfth individual to hold the office of President since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Having won the presidency following a prolonged period as prime minister, Erdogan has become the single most influential individual in Turkish politics since Mustafa Kemal. Given Erdogan’s current ambitions to bring about major constitutional change in Turkey, his election to the presidency can be seen as ushering in a new era for the Turkish Republic.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

This paper applies the categorization of welfare state systems set out by Esping-Andersen in 1990 to the welfare state in Egypt. It analyzes the relationships between state, market, and society over the 10 years from 1995 to 2005, which were marked by a shift to a market economy and a confrontation with the historical legacy of the state’s social role. The best description for the current welfare state in Egypt is “conservative/unorganized” in that social security entitlements are limited to work in the formal sector, which makes the family, religious institutions, and patronage networks take on important roles in meeting the social needs of the large informal sector. Additionally, the study proposes some modifications to the Esping-Andersen categorization with the aim of understanding welfare programs in developing countries. When analyzing welfare systems in general, particularly in the developing countries, it is necessary to take into account methodologically aspects of mismanagement, considerations of quality, the gap between stated aims and their implementation, the disparity resulting from differences between countryside and city and between the sexes, and the role of the informal sector.

This paper explores attitudes among Syrian refugees and displaced persons towards the presidential elections held in their country on June 3, 2014. Respondents came from refugee camps located in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan as well as internally displaced persons camps along the Syrian-Turkish frontier. Survey questions also asked respondents about their views of the existing regime and its institutions in addition to their prescriptions for an “ideal solution” to the Syrian crisis. Answers to the latter question came in three distinct categories. A clear majority (64%) which supports a change of regime as the path to an ideal solution to the Syrian conflict, in contrast to a mere 6% who support the total defeat of the opposition by the regime as an ideal end to the crisis. A third group, accounting for 23% of respondents, held that the ideal solution to the Syrian conflict would be peaceful, based on a dialogue which brought together the regime and the opposition.