The Problematic Division of Intra-Military Relations During the Separation Phase in Syria (1961-1963)

Abstract

By analysing qualitative and archival primary sources, this paper examines intra-military relations in Syria during the period in which Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (1961 - 1963). It explores the consequences of the failure to apply what can be described as "Concordance Theory", particularly regarding the impact of military divisions on civil-military relations, and how these divisions led to dangerous fragmentation within the military institution itself. Additionally, it examines the role these divisions played in the disintegration of the political system during the secession, without neglecting the social and political conditions that influenced these developments. The paper highlights the emergence of the Damascene 'Shwam' officers' faction as a result of policies aimed at containing and dismantling military factions during the unity period, and how this faction managed to lead the secession coup. It also analyses how this elite failed to maintain control over the army and government institutions, with their efforts to assert control giving rise to competing coup factions, ultimately leading to the collapse of military leadership and the loss of command and control. This paved the way for the military coup on 8 March 1963.