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This study explores the perceptions of Britain's main political parties towards the Palestinian Islamist faction Hamas throughout the period between 2003 and 2016. It explores also the extent of variation between the major political parties in the UK towards Hamas. The author argues that the lack of a value-based outlook on the part of the British ruling establishment as well as a lack of respect for the tenets of international law—which enshrines the right to resist occupation—have driven that establishment to embrace the UK's colonial legacy, and to regard their government as the founder and protector of the State of Israel. It is this establishmentarian discourse, argues the author, which drives the criminalization of Hamas within British politics.

This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

The wave of democracy, peaceful or violent, has up till now dispelled many of the illusions prevalent in the West, in Europe especially, including so-called "Arab exceptionalism"—that is the notion that Arabs are not interested in democracy, are indifferent to whether it is present in their lives or not, and are basically not ready for it. A second dismantled illusion is that of the "good dictator" that is based on the claim that dictators loyal to the West are a better bet than the Islamist alternative. A third illusion concerns the idea that the Arab world is itself a construct and that the attractiveness of a supranational Arab identity has gone. The Arab revolutions, however, have proved the above theories wrong. It is not a coincidence that the wave for change broke out in a number of Arab states at the same time and in the same fashion with more or less the same slogans shouted out in the same language, and were able in a very short time to bring down four regimes. The Arab revolutions took academic circles by surprise and made some academics claim that understanding the future of Middle East politics required that academics carry out a serious reassessment of the restored importance of Pan-Arab identity.

​​​​​​This section highlights the most significant political document related to democratic transformation in the Arab world. In this issue, we present document from Syria covering the period from July 1 to August 31, 2025.​​​

This study addresses a manifestation of the crisis within contemporary Arab political theory by examining the status of justice and analyzing the methodologies employed by selected theorists in constructing their political visions relative to this concept. We highlight the importance of a philosophical perspective and the imperative for political thought to confront aspects of this crisis. The central thesis defended here posits the necessity of shifting the discourse on justice from an abstract, transcendental perspective, often encapsulated by the question, what is justice? towards a relative vision. This alternative vision considers how justice, as a value, becomes embedded within Arab moral and political consciousness. Such a reorientation requires recognizing the significance of justice, its cultural contextualization, and its integral relationship with the concept of justification.

Book Title: The Governance Crisis in Sudan: Crisis of Hegemony or Hegemony of Crisis? [Arabic]

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

The political transition in Syria after the fall of Assad regime faces many interpretations and challenges. This study attempts to identify the situational determinants that form the general framework of the political transition map, especially since any transition process is linked to the determinants of the Syrian revolutionary situation. While most theories of political transition focus on democratization, the study assumes that the political transition in Syria requires an in-depth treatment of the issues that characterize the relationship between the three elements that make up the political sphere: state, political system and society. With help of some of Wolfgang Merkel’s theoretical ideas, the study develops a model of interactive political construction that supports the production of a collective political culture by looking at politics as a concept and as a practice. Through a critical analysis of some aspects of politics under Assad regime, the study concludes that political transition requires reforming the socio-political system by reforming the relationship between the state, power and society in order to build a new political space based on continuous interaction between them.

Several scholars studying the so-called authoritarian elections argue that the primary motivation for citizens to vote in the Arab world is the pursuit of individual (mostly material) interests driven by clientelism that may take the form of explicit vote-buying or granting services and privileges to electors. However, research overlooked the potential impact of citizens' evaluation of the regime's democratic level on electoral participation. The goal of this study is to fill this gap. The analysis of the eighth round of the Arab Opinion Index (2022) across nine Arab countries—Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania— reveals that individuals who perceive their country as more democratic are more likely to vote, regardless of objective indicators suggesting the undemocratic nature of the political system.