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This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

For months, the transitional phase in Tunisia underwent a critical historical period that almost foiled efforts to establish a newly-born democratic state and undermined the foundational work of the post-revolution state. In fact, the increasing violence, the high living cost, the raging conflict over power, the intermittent rise of partisan, ideological and religious tensions, the return of the old regime media, the emergence of the harbingers of a counter-revolution and the decrease in Tunisia’s sovereign ranking showed followers of the situation that the Arab Spring in its first cradle was at risk. Citizens felt afraid, and they longed for stability and reassurance. The deteriorating political situation based on polarization and dispute between the ruling troika and the opposition added insult to injury. The paper sheds light on the situation of the prominent influential political parties in Tunisia and on the complexities of the political crisis. It also explores the prospects of the upcoming phase.

​This article analyses the development of civil-military relations in Ethiopia and how they are affected by politics, culture and ethnicity whilst drawing on compatibility theory. It explores a fundamental issue: to what extent does ethnic and cultural diversity influence civil-military relations in Ethiopia? The article begins with the hypothesis that the military's interests and political affiliations arise from their vision of the nation-state's interest, and may conflict with the attitudes of civil institutions, complicating the separation between civil and military institutional mandates. The article demonstrates how the social structure and distribution of tribes has had an impact on the reform processes of successive political systems in Ethiopia. Moreover, it concludes that consensus in civil-military relations and civilian control of government will continue in the future if slogans of centralization and citizenship are actualized through legal and democratic methods based on the principles of justice and equality in rights and duties among all constituents.

This study raises several pressing questions: Was the fall of the Salvation Regime in Sudan the result of an internal initiative or the opposition coalition, or both? To what extent did external dynamics influence the overthrow of regime and the transition to democracy? Is the post-Salvation regime likely to follow a democratic trajectory, or will it turn into another authoritarian regime? The study concludes that it is likely that the agreed goal between the international powers and their authoritarian partners in the region is to move Sudan to a "hybrid" system, where the elements of the old authoritarian regime remain in power, while maintaining a minimum level of democracy. In addition, the ruling military-civilian coalition will find support from the United States and the European Union (and their regional allies), enabling it to dismantle the institutions of the former regime, accommodate a number of armed movements in the political process, and gradually integrate into the international (security and economic) system. Meanwhile, domestically, the transitional government will face challenges that may not only lead to the collapse of the transitional process, but also to the collapse of the Sudanese state itself.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

Revolution is coupled with the state, and thinking about the former is linked to investigating the other, whether in history or political theory. Therefore, the Arab revolutions, as they were overthrowing the authoritarian regimes, had to evoke ideas about the state. This evocation would necessarily lead to an interrogation of the reality of the “nation state” and its future. The problematic dealt with directly in this paper, therefore, is whether the nation state was a subject for the revolution or a framework for it? On this analytical horizon a great many ironies and questions become apparent: is the revolution a sign of the decline of the national state and a decisive closure to a whole period when the state declared the impossibility of modernization and democracy? Or is it a late consolidation of the legitimacy of the nation state as the institutional expression of a national group, with the event of the revolution forming the pinnacle of its coalescence as a political nation? Does the idea of the nation state require burying once and for all, or does it need reconstruction? Was the Arab Spring a revolt against nationalism(s) or was it their maturation and the culmination of their consolidation?

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

Rights groups and social movements in Egypt, including the April 6 Youth Movement developed the Transitional Justice Law based on previous experiences worldwide such as the South African one. Tunisia, which was the starting point of the Arab revolutions, beat Egypt to it by cooperating with the Ministry of Justice in South Africa. In 2003, Morocco established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to look into human rights abuses from 1956-1999. This paper discusses the possibility of implementing the notion of transitional justice in Egypt and tries to use an approach that puts the national reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms in their wider framework, i.e. democratic transition and institutional reform based on negotiations with political forces. The paper explores the philosophy of transitional justice, the organizational qualities that contribute to its success and the conditions that help overcome any arising challenges or possible resistance.

​عنوان الكتاب: نهاية مرحلة: كيف يقوّض الإحياء السلطوي للصين صعودها. عنوان الكتاب في لغته: End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise المؤلف: كارل مينزنر Carl Minzner مكان النشر: نيويورك. الناشر: Oxford University Press تاريخ النشر: 2018. عدد الصفحات: 296 صفحة.

Alongside two constitutions, an old one brought down by a revolution and a new one drawn up by the "constituent power", the state enters a transitional phase during which it is usually ruled by "interim constitutions", enforced by the "transitional constituent" to act as a bridge between the two major constitutions in temporarily regulating the transition and the relationship between authorities. Since the "transitional constituent" wields "authority" outside of constitutional legitimacy, and since contingency and intentionality are inherent features of interim constitutions, a question arises about the extent of the "transitional constituent's" impact on shaping the constituent power, and the legacy of the interim constitutions in drawing up the permanent constitution. The study explores this question, addressing the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences in a comparative context, within a timeframe that begins with the regime collapse in early 2011 and ends with the entry into force of the current constitution in both countries in early 2014. The study seeks to understand the repercussions of the constitutional designing of the transition on the foundational process, and the constitutional regime that it has produced today in the two countries.