Latest Articles

This study explores the use of sports as a diplomatic soft power tool employed by states to achieve foreign policy objectives. It adopts a constructivist framework that highlights the role of symbolic factors in shaping state behaviour. Focusing on Qatar, as a small state lacking traditional power resources, the study examines how its leadership turned to alternative tools, notably sports, as a strategic means of influence. Qatari sports diplomacy relies on four main pillars: investing in global sports clubs, developing infrastructure and hosting major sporting events, investing in sports media, and supporting local sports. This strategic use of sport has contributed to redefining Qatar's role and enhancing its international standing, enabling it to exercise political and economic influence and to support the diversification of its national economy.

​Using a realist approach, this study explains the development of international institutions in the Arab system, taking the Arab League and the Arab Monetary Fund as case studies. It puts to the test realist assumptions regarding states as major actors in the international system and examines how the principle of chaos and the absence of central authority affect their behaviour. In this context, the prisoner's dilemma is used as a mirror for security interactions and chaotic structures in the Arab and international systems. The study shows that realist assumptions are not sufficient to explain the development of Arab institutions; they need to be modified to explain the variation in international behaviour in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on an analysis of the reward environment in which Arab countries interact, and its division into a security-military sphere and a political-economic sphere.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

An analysis of the strategic documents produced by the United States can play a significant role in understanding the comprehensive visions of successive administrations in dealing with the outside world. However, these documents cannot present a day-to-day picture of what a given administration might do amid rapidly evolving crises. In analyzing each document, these day-to-day strategic concerns, which in fact govern each US strategic document, must be taken into account. This study attempts to analyze the text of the 2015 UN national security strategy by taking into account the international context, its goals, priorities, and governing principles. The analysis carries out an assessment of six key strategic indicators in the strategy document, as well as nine indicators of change compared to the 2010 document. This paints a picture of the larger vision of the Obama administration and the White House, which will shape US foreign and security policy until the end of his term.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

This paper examines the war that broke out in Sudan on April 15 , 2023 , through a comprehensive contextual lens that resists fragmenting its causes and obscuring the wider panorama. It argues that the war must be understood as part of an extended historical trajectory - spanning five centuries - of nation-building and state-building. The study analyzes the theoretical concepts of nation and state building, especially in the African context, and explores their practical manifestations in Sudan. It also investigates how the absence of prioritization by post-independence elites accelerated the slide into conflict. Using historical and political analysis, the paper concludes that, with the high human cost of the war, its resolution depends upon a broad-based national consensus.

The Strategic Studies Unit Conference of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a symposium on August 29, 2022, entitled "Ukraine: Conventional and Unconventional Military Developments and Foreign Fighters", attended by three researchers specialising in security and strategic studies, Omar Ashour, director of the Strategic Studies Unit and head of the Critical Security Studies Graduate Programme (MCSS) at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Kacper Edward Rekawe, postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo, and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon are chemical weapons advisers to NGOs working in Syria and Iraq. He is a former commanding officer of the UK Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Regiment and NATO's Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion. It was chaired by Sidahmed Goudjili, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

​Arab narratives of the June, 1967 War remained limited in scope even today, 50 years after the cessation of hostilities. “The June, 1967 War” was held in Doha, Qatar from June 20-22, 2017, the three-day meeting was devoted to studying the events of the war and its ongoing repercussions through the prisms of military history and strategic analysis.

This book offers an in-depth examination of Qatar's hosting of the 2022 World Cup through an international relations lens. It explores Qatar's objectives, mostly at the international level, that drove the decision to host the event.