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This study addresses the extent to which the "participatory" framework is compatible with the networks of Tunisian elites since the Revolution of 2011. The author seeks to understand, analyze and interpret the theoretical approaches which allowed Tunisian politicians to reduce the level of political divisions within the country. The author further illustrates how Tunisia's formal political parties adapted and developed in the post-revolutionary setting, despite the revolution unraveling the vast extent of a societal rift in Tunisia which has dominated the country's political debates since that time. Finally, the study explores in depth the role and influence of Tunisian political elites as it relates to the praxis of participatory democracy, something which could not have been possible without the consciousness and awareness of these elites and their duty to fulfill their roles.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

​It was mostly British colonisers who came to consolidate the political, economic and military interests of the motherland and did what they used to do: play football. Apart from spending their time, football worked as a colonial instrument both "civilising" and "disciplining" the colonised populations. The first clubs in North Africa and the Levant restricted membership for non-Westerners and non-whites, but soon football also became a transnational transmitter of independence movements, the stadiums becoming important social spaces on the local and national levels. Such was the emancipatory force of football that it has been preserved across the region ever since the colonial era, prominent again in the Arab Uprisings. However, the massive wealth of the Gulf States and their decision to invest in football's soft power has changed the equation. The article thus describes emancipatory and counter-emancipatory trends in MENA football history from a longue durée perspective.

The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954 - 1958 , which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

​According to Jonathan Grix and Fiona Carmichael, when implementing national sport policies, one of the governments' main objectives is to invest funds into gaining international prestige. Although these national sport policies' objectives have also been identified by several other leading scholars in sport governance, research proposing a measurement of these policies' success or failure remains scarce. In fact, to evaluate if countries have reached international prestige through sports, researchers tend to generally refer to the Olympic Medal Table, while the newly created soft power indicators, the "Soft Power 30", "Soft Power Index" and "Global Soft Power Index" have not managed to use appropriate sport rankings to measure countries' capacities to use sport as an instrument of soft power. The objective of this paper is to identify the inaccuracies of these commonly used indices and propose a new ranking that would evaluate whether the national sport policies implemented by governments have succeeded in developing soft power.

The debate continues over the "Arab Spring" revolutions and the evaluation of their results continues, especially within the framework of the "success-failure" dichotomy, based on sociological analysis tools that generally emphasize their shortcomings. This study argues that these revolutions have reformist goals with value-oriented and normative contents touching on the core of the political question, which are no less important than material goals such as regime overthrow. Attempting to provide an alternative interpretation of the Arab situation through a different epistemological approach, this study aims to demonstrate the non-material political content of the Arab revolutions by incorporating normative and sociological ideas and conceptions into a new conceptual and methodological approach. Accordingly, the study adresses the political dimensions of revolutionary demands: the decisive rejection of authoritarianism and affirmation of political rights. While attempting to refute the assessment of the Arab revolutions as a failure to achieve democratic transition, it posits that the non-material revolutionary purpose is to highlight a "return to politics" as a basis for future political and democratic change. This is a call to rethink all aspects of Arab politics and to establish new foundations for a contractual relationship between the state and society that meets the conditions of the time.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

ﺗﺒﻨ ﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻮن اوروﺑﻴﻮن واﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﻮن واÈ ﻋﻼم واﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، ﺑﺤﻤﺎسٍ، ﺳﻨﺔ 2011، ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد ا وروﺑﻲ ﺑﺪﻋﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻮّل اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺑﺴﺨﺎء. وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻟﻢ ﻳﺮقَاوروﺑﻴﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى وﻋﻮدﻫﻢ؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ودوﻟﻪ اﻋﻀﺎء، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺤﺮب اﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان، واﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻓﻲ أﺧﺮى، إﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻔﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ ﻋﻮارض ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات. وﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﺆﺛ ﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، أﺛ ﺮت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ. ﺗﺤﻠﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﻨﺎﻫﺞ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ "اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ"، وأدواﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ، وأوﻟﻮﻳﺎﺗﻪ، وﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪى اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اورﺑﻲ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﻮﻧﺲ. In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. Te EU pledged to generously support transformation processes initiated in the region. Yet, Europeans – as other third parties – have not lived up to their promises. Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings turning into violence and civil war in some countries and authoritarian restoration in others, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Indeed, rather than the EU impacting on the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring, these dynamics have strongly impacted on Europe. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper analyzes the EU's approaches, instruments and priorities – and how the latter have changed over the course of the last years.

The potential impact of the Covid- 19 pandemic on populist governments has been the subject of a heated debate among specialists. There are scholars for who the pandemic will negatively impact populist governments. Here, populist governments are perceived as ill-equipped to respond to the multifaced challenges risen by the complexity of the pandemic. Conversely, many scholars that argue that the pandemic will strengthen populist governments because populism flourishes during crises. This article contests these two narratives. It asserts that any evaluation of the impact of the pandemic on populist governments should distinguish between their actions and their discourse. Thus, the study undertakes an analysis of US president Trump’s discourse, demonstrating that during the first year of the pandemic, it is twofold. First appears a “disconnected discourse” that continuously questions the reality of the pandemic, despite the important proactive actions taken by his government to mitigate the pandemic's economic, social, and sanitary impacts. Second, a “demonstrative discourse” arises, in which the pandemic was instrumentalized to enhance the legitimacy of one of the most important and controversial elements of the populist discourse: the idea of external threat.

Scholarship explains impediments to democratic transition in Middle Eastern countries as forms of neopatrimonialism - a combination of patrimonial tradition and cosmetic electoral procedures. However, this approach conflates two spheres of governance: firstly, the government as a sphere of appointed or elected politicians, secondly, the state's bureaucracy as a sphere of administrative staff necessary for the government to execute its planned actions. The impediments Hamas governments (2006-2007) faced highlight the difference between the two spheres. Accordingly, I conceptually differentiate between two types of government: government in office and government in power. While the Hamas government was supposed to rule, the administrative personnel refused to comply. Thus, the elected government in office faced local-institutional and external constraints which prevented its functioning, and provoked power struggles that led to internecine war and the collapse of the electoral democracy.