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This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

In an effort to understand the characteristics of "virtual communities" and specifically "information societies," this study attempts to test the argument that virtual communities, with their networked structure, pose a challenge (or represent an alternative) to traditional hierarchical structures, due to the former's ability to self-organize, and settle their internal disputes without the need for authoritative intervention. The study uses the case study approach, applied to 3 Wikipedia's edit wars. The chosen cases are related to a number of Middle East informational crises. The study concludes that mechanisms of virtual societies (e.g. self-organization) can work efficiently in cases of limited disputes, but in cases of sharp disagreements, traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms that include authoritative intervention and exercising some form of power, in a "top-down" approach, remain essential for conflict resolution. This implies that the factor of "authority" remains significant even in the context of virtual communities.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

This study provides a discussion and analysis of the circumstances that led to the military occupation of the core of the state and government in contemporary Algeria, and the ramifications for the process of building political and legal institutions, and the democratic transition experience. The study employs the concepts of populism and neopatrimonialism to paint a picture of the path taken by the government in Algeria since independence. Populism describes the ideology that sanctified the one-party state and revolutionary legitimacy, while neopatrimonialism is the resulting shape taken by the exercise of political power. Framing these two concepts within their historical context provides an understanding of the circumstances of the army's seizure of power and its identification with the state. It clarifies the reasons for its refusal to redistribute power within the society after the establishment of political pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

​The study addresses the issue of armament and the security dilemma in the Maghreb region, focusing on the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. It argues that the armament level of the two countries has risen significantly in recent years, in the context of structural rivalry, making the Maghreb region one of the most heavily armed regions in the world, despite the absence of existential inter-Maghreb threats. The study attempts to examine the armament issue in the Maghreb and to understand its determinants and developments, focusing on the factors that influence it and on its likely consequences. Adopting the realist approach as a theoretical framework, it analyses SIRPI's data to demonstrate the high volume of Maghreb military expenditure and its evolution, and examines the Maghreb armament and its determinants and military risks. The study concludes that: the armament of the two countries reflects their competition over leadership and their threat perceptions; the armament dynamic is independent from the inter-Maghreb political tensions; the existence of a potential military confrontation between the two regional powers due to the interaction between emerging factors and structural ones.

​A one-day academic symposium hosted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will bring together experts from Russia, the Arab world and the region to examine Moscow’s latest military intervention in Syria, on Saturday, October 24, 2015. While Russia’s decision to intervene directly in the conflict in Syria comes as the culmination of more than four years of diplomatic and military support for the Assad regime, the move by the Kremlin to deploy its military forces has come as a surprise to many observers, becoming a turning point not only in the militarized revolution within Syria, but also in the broader Middle East and indeed in a larger global arena. To better study the circumstances which gave rise to the Russian maneuver and the outcomes likely to result from it, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies will convene “Russian Military Intervention in Syria: Motives, Objectives and Repercussions”. In the highly volatile climate which the Middle East is presently witnessing, selected participants at the meeting will be asked to examine the fallout of Russia’s actions on the future stability of the region.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

اﺗﺴﻤﺖ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ازﻣﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وا ﻣﺎرات واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪوء واﻟﺜﻘﺔ واﻻﺗﺰان. وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺐ أن ﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻘﻄﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ا زﻣﺔ، ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﺠﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻣﺮورًا ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺮﻣﺠﺔ، ﻣﻦ دون اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ "ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ". وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر ﻗﺪ ﺧﻄﻄﺖ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ا زﻣﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﻨﺢ اﻟﻈﻼم، ﻓﺠﺮ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮب "اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﻊ واﻟﺼﺪﻣﺔ" اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻓﺈن ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻣﺘﺼﺎص "اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ اوﻟﻰ"، ﺑﻼ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺄة. وﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ داء اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ وردة ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ إزاء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﻨﻌﻄﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ ازﻣﺔ، ﻳُﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗ ﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﻬﺪوء، واﻟﺜﻘﺔ، واﻻﺗﺰان، اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺴﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ اداء اﻟﻘﻄﺮي، وﻫﺬه اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻫﻲ: ﺳﻘﻮط ﻋﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﺟﺄة، وﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ "اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ"، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ، وارﺗﺒﺎك اﻟﺨﺼﻢ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴّﺔ، اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ، اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ. Since the outbreak of the crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on 24 May 2017, Qatar's diplomacy has been characterised by calm, confidence and balance. The observer can't understand the diplomatic approach of Qatar in dealing with all stages of the crisis - from explosion to siege, through state-orchestrated media campaigns - without knowing the "behind the scenes" facts. Blockading countries planned to blow the crisis up under the cover of darkness, before the dawn of May 24. But Qatar was, unsurprisingly, able to absorb the "shock and awe" first strike. Five factors characterise the country's diplomatic performance as it has reacted to developments and turning points in the crisis: The failure of the 'element of surprise', years of building Qatar's "nation brand", Qatar's arsenal of "soft power", international alliances, and the opponents' quandary.