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Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

​This article debates the significance of cultural differences in the identification and application of principles of sport governance. It attempts at refuting the underlying assumption that the ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport governance in the West represents the model to be emulated by the non-west. It argues that modernisation of sport is liable to take on subtly different forms in different local contexts which are modern but not uniform, supporting in effect a form of ‘multiple modernities’. Sport governance, like modernity itself, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, as its (cultural, political, and/or economic, and thus sport) forms varies as much as cultural contexts do, and their characteristics overlap rather than tend to take a unitary set of features attributable to a single model.

​​​​​​This report provides an account of the main Palestinian events related to the Arab-Israeli conflict during the period from September 1 to October 31, 2025.​​​

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

This paper discusses the implications of the Iranian nuclear agreement inside Iran which is experiencing an ongoing battle between moderates and conservatives. It also observes and analyzes the responses within the Gulf states, which is the Arab bloc geographically closest to Iran and the most involved with it and fearful of it. The agreement restrains the Iranian Republic more than it gives it free rein, as it places Iran under international monitoring. The kind of sanctions that can be imposed on Iran in future, if it violates any or all of the provisions of the agreement are a factor controlling Iran’s future course. Alternatively, from what has come to light, it is clear that the marathon negotiations were not limited to the nuclear agreement, as both sides wish to portray. Rather other issues were discussed, including Iran’s future role in the region and the world. The acceleration of action on Syria and Yemen may be a reflection of these other issues.

Many tropes exist in the public sphere regarding determinants of sectarian sentiments. For example, it is assumed that the less educated and more vulnerable might be more easily swayed by sectarian arguments. However, rather than rely anecdotal evidence, this question can be assessed empirically. The Arab Opinion Index contains a variety of demographic indicators as well as questions capturing sectarian sentiment. Using this data, factors that truly have an effect on the prevalence of sectarian sentiment can begin to be explained.

The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

By making use of the data provided by the Arab Opinion Index during the periods 20172018- and 20192020-, a survey implemented by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in 13 Arab countries, this paper deals with Arab public opinion towards Iran in two periods – before and after 2011 – based on an analysis of survey respondents' views of Iranian foreign policy, as conveyed in their answers. It answers a set of sub-questions: How has Iran's involvement in Syria and Yemen affected its image in the Arab world? Is Iran seen as a threat in the Arab world? Did Iran's policy towards Palestine contribute to improving its image in the Arab world? Are sectarian goals seen to be driving Iran's foreign policy towards the Arab world?

How do opinions of gender equality affect perceptions of democracy? Much has been written linking procedural democracy with underlying democratic values; in essence, the argument is that without a general support for democratic values, systems of democratic governance may erode and decline. Democratic values/attitudes are often defined as support for inclusive political and civil freedoms, as well as the institutional safeguards which guarantee them. Opinions towards women's rights can be considered part and parcel of democratic values. Thus, in this paper, we ask whether opinions of gender equality can help predict democratic, or anti-democratic, sentiment. Essentially, we seek to address the question: can one profess a belief in democracy while simultaneously holding misogynistic views and excluding women?

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.