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​This study investigates the forced displacement of Palestinians in the context of Zionist settler colonialism in Area C, including in the Jordan Valley, which represents more than 60 percent of the West Bank. The study details colonial policy in this region, analyzing the patterns of forced displacement in the villages of Bardala, al-Farisiyah, Al-Sakot, Khirbet Humsa, Al-Malih and Khirbet Al-Hama, based on the position of the region within the colonial project. It also evaluates the impact of this displacement on the geographical and demographic reality on the ground. It attempts to discuss the relationship between the use of forced displacement as a means to take control of the land, and to exploit and expel the Palestinians.

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

It is difficult to imagine an influential presence for Salafism in Turkey despite the talk of the "spread" of Salafism there. This must be accompanied by methodological questions that articulate the challenges related to the intellectual environment of the Turkish society. It also relates to the historical context and political competition amongst the Sunni community. One question is "How could Salafism have such a powerful presence in a Sufi society, whose empire had adopted the 'opinion approach' of Abu Hanifa and Maturidi and whose modern republic had adopted the philosophy of the West and secularism?" Both are contrary to the Salafi approach based on tradition and the literal commitment to the texts of the Quran, Hadith and the sayings of 'al-Salaf a-Saleh'. Another question is "How can Salafism overcome the historical and psychological barrier in Turkey that formed as a result of Ottoman-Saudi disputes at the beginning of the nineteenth century and whose intellectual effects have continued until a recent time?"

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

This presentation reviews the development of public administration research in the Arab world and its relationship to public policies, with a focus on research that relied on studying the development of the field in the US experience. It suggests that the political, economic and social environment, as well as values remain essential determinants of academic and practical work in public administration, and that the pursuit of global frameworks and models remains subject to an understanding of environmental factors. The same applies to the field of public policy. Siyasat Arabiya thus devoted this special issue to shed light on the field of public administration and public policies in the Arab world. It presented comparative perspectives of the status of public administration research and public policies, with a view to asking questions, inviting researchers and those interested in public administration in the Arab region to consider issues and research methodologies in matters of public affairs, and calling for the development of a research and teaching agenda that engages with points of intellectual and methodological discord that characterize the field in the West.

This paper offers insights into the Crisis of Liberal International Order by combining Ibn Khaldun's theory of change with scholarship on liberalism and race. We argue that the crisis emerges from the incongruence of two features of liberal order: a binding feature (or 'assabiyya) of white supremacy and liberalism's principles of equality. The crisis is an outcome of a normative political order that can no longer balance a material and discursive reality of racialised hierarchy with ideals of equality. The crisis cannot be reduced to bad leadership or a technical failure to enact liberal values. Instead, attempts to think beyond the crisis must acknowledge the incongruence between white supremacy and liberal equality. Through this diagnosis, we gesture towards the constructive use of "non-Western" theory in the discipline of International Relations.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ أﺣﺪ ﺟﻮاﻧﺐ ﻋﻘﺪة ﻛﺮﻛﻮك اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺘﺌﺖ ﺗﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻣﻨﺬ ﺳﻘﻮط اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻲ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ، وذﻟﻚ ﻋﺒﺮ ﺗﻔﻜﻴﻚ اﻟﻤﺄزق اﻟﺬي آل إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﺼﻴﺮ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻛﺮﻛﻮك، ﻣﻨﺬ أول ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻗﺘﺮاع ﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم 2005. وﺗﺘﺘﺒّﻊ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﺤﻮﻻت اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻏﺮاﻓﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ، وﻣﺎ ﺻﺎﺣﺒﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻐﻴﺮات ﻓﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺒﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﻗﻴﺔ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﺳﺘﻨﻄﺎق ﻣﺎ ﺗﻮﻓﺮه اﻟﺘﻌﺪادات واﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮات اﻟﺴﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺟﺮﻳﺖ ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ ﻋﺎم 1921. وﺗﺮﻣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ذﻟﻚ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻄﻼع ﻛﻴﻒ أﻧﺘﺠﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﺤﻮﻻت وأﺟﺠﺖ ﺧﻼﻓﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻄﻮط ﺗﻤﺎس ﻋﺮﻗﻴﺔ ﺣﻮل ﺣﻖ اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ؛ أدت إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎء ﻛﺮﻛﻮك ﻣﻦ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺮاق ﻟﺪورﺗﻴﻦ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﺘﻴﻦ إﻟﻰ ﺣﺪ ا¤ ن، 2009 و 2013. وﺗﻨﺒﺮي اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺨﻴﺔ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﺐ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ إﺑﺎن ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ، ﻗﺒﻞ أن ﺗﻨﺘﻘﻞ إﻟﻰ رﺳﻢ ﺻﻮرة اﻻرﺗﻔﺎع اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﺜﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﺴﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﺮدﻳﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺬ ﻋﺎم 2003. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻛﺮﻛﻮك، اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻏﺮاﻓﻲ، اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎزع ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. Tis paper investigates the crisis in which provincial elections in Kirkuk has been enmeshed since the first provincial polls in post-Saddam Iraq held in 2005. It plots the trajectory of ethnic demographic changes in Kirkuk since the formation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 and probes how these transformations inflamed discord along ethnic fault lines leading to excluding Kirkuk from two provincial elections, 2009 and 2013, till now. Tracing the intensification of the Kirkuk crisis against the backdrop of the failure of constitutional and legal solutions designed to resolve the so-called "disputed internal boundaries" problem, the paper analyzes the election results and demographic data in Kirkuk to shed light on the deepening electoral crisis in the province. It concludes by making recommendations aimed at reforming electoral registration in Kirkuk.

This paper compares the results of the Fragile States Index issued by the Fund for Peace, a charitable organization, with indicators established in the Arab Opinion Index, an annual survey undertaken by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in a number of Arab countries. These indicators reflect the assessments provided by Arab respondents of economic, social and political issues and what their views mean in light of the specific country contexts. The paper also examines whether citizens' views can be relied upon as indicators of the vulnerability of the state and the extent to which the indicators of state vulnerability are accurate by comparing them with the opinions of citizens in different areas. In this context, based on the Arab Index survey, the paper relied on nine indicators out of 12 adopted by the Fragile States Index in order to interpret economic, social and political opinions expressed by respondents.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.