Latest Articles

This section reviews the most significant political documents related to democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish a selection of documents from Yemen and Syria, covering the period from 1 January to 28 February 2026.

This paper presents an overview of evolving trends in Egyptian public opinion towards a host of security-related and political issues during the period between January 2011 and the 2018 presidential elections.

​تعــرض هــذه الورقــة، أولًا، أحــدث الاتجاهات في الــرأي العام الفلســطيني، وتحلل هــذا الرأي تجــاه الحكومــة الحاليــة في الضفة الغربية. وتبحــث، ثانيًا، تأثير الاستقطاب في الرأي العام الفلســطيني. وتتنــاول، أخيــرًا، الــرأي العــام الفلســطيني فــي ما يتعلــق بمســتقبل القضية الفلسطينية.

​What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index's 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance.

​What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index's 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance.

The literature on state capacity is often at odds with what constitutes state capacity, how to operationalize it, and how to measure it. Nevertheless, it is important for us to attempt this endeavor given the importance of state capacity, and its effect on a number of political and social dynamics. With the proliferation of quality surveys in the Arab world in recent years, we also have an unprecedented opportunity to examine state capacity in a new light, according to citizen perceptions in addition to material measures. Thus, in this paper I will examine variations of state capacity measurements using the Arab Opinion Index data. I will provide evidence to show that many political phenomena can only be understood if the conditions surrounding state capacity are accounted for.

China’s foreign policy is concerned with strengthening relations with states of significance in the world, whether large or small. Its strategic culture plays a key role in shaping its vision of the international order, its objectives, and the tools it employs to enhance its global standing. China has primarily relied on soft power instruments in its relations with other countries, particularly in the economic sphere, and it recognizes the importance of the State of Qatar within the Arab region in general and among energy-exporting countries in particular. Accordingly, China has concluded long-term contracts for the import of substantial quantities of natural gas and has been constructing massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers for Qatar. Although Qatar is considered a key ally of the United States, China and Qatar signed a strategic partnership in 2014 covering multiple fields. Both countries seek to further develop this partnership in alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Qatar’s National Vision 2030.

ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف أﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻮز/ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ 2013. وﺗﺨﺘﺒﺮ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﻬﺎ، وﺗﺠﺎدل ﺑﺄﻧ ﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻀﻴﻴﻖ واﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﻘﻮى واﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﻓﺈن ﺛﻤﺔ أﺷﻜﺎﻟ ﺎ وأﻧﻤﺎﻃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ واﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻇﻬﺮت ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻘﻤﻌﻴﺔ. وﻗﺪ راوﺣﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻧﻤﺎط وا ﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺳﻠﻤﻴﺔ وأﺧﺮى ﻋﻨﻴﻔﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺣﻘﻮﻗﻴﺔ. ﻟﺬا ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ وأﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ودرﺟﺎﺗﻪ، وﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﻳﺆدي إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج أم زﻳﺎدﺗﻪ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪه، ﺑﻄﺮق وأﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻧﻘﻼب 2013، اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ، ﻣﺼﺮ. This study explores political mobilization in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013, and the way in which regime oppression shaped the responses of political forces within the country. The author argues that novel and varied forms of political mobilization have emerged in Egypt in the past few years in spite of regime oppression. The nature of the response was also dictated on the relevant group’s focus. This paper shall attempt to unravel the dialectical relationship between state repression and political dissent in Egypt, seeking to determine the ways in which state repression shapes the form and intensity of political dissent

The purpose of this paper is to study the Algerian experience with the Arab spring by identifying the nature of the protests movements in Algeria, to search the adaptation mechanisms of the Algerian political regime with the protest act and to answer the question: why the change in Algeria is so hard to happen? Next, this paper will expose a range of the most important political bets to understand better the Algerian exception by searching the roots of the crisis which has been overcomed in searching a radical and real reform. Finally, this paper will be concluded by addressing the prospects of political, institutional and economical changes and by exposing a future scenarios of the hard transition in light of internal and external challenges.

This paper argues that hybrid regimes help to create an environment that encourages the transformation of political disputes into identity conflicts. In such regimes, there is no resolution to the advantage of a particular party, since there is neither full authoritarianism that prevents the existence of any form of competition, rivalry, or conflict, or full democracy that permits the existence of democratic competition according to principles of pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and legal guarantees. In the environment of these hybrid regimes there are some features of democracy and many features of authoritarianism, and so political competition usually begins as a dispute over points of view and intellectual assumptions and ends up as an identity conflict leading to the dissociation of society.