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This study breaks from the prevailing discourse portraying minorities as victims, presenting them as multi-dimensional historical actors and analysing their relationship with political modernity and national construction. It demonstrates how sectarian differences were sharpened and Ottoman culture facilitated the manipulation of minority groups by religious elites and the ruling clan. The Assad regime, supported by Alawi clientelism, fuelled fear of Sunni Islam. In addition, the revolution that began in 2011, accompanied by severe violent repression, has turned into a civil war. The Assad employs sectarian vocabulary that targets the Sunni majority in favour of the Shia minority and Iran. It views Damascus as the capital of minorities, seeking to restore demographic change in Syria. The study discusses factors to encourage a pluralist future Syria and focuses on the issue of the state model that must be redefined, taking into account the existence of all sects that share the same political culture, and all of them, including the Sunnis, demand guarantees.

The Palestinian Authority today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy, has led to a situation in which the PA's days may be numbered. This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the PA's promised territory. But Palestinian society today has undergone immense transformation since 1994; Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, and its formalized institutions which have overtaken Palestinian society for the past two decades disappear, how will Palestinians respond? Will the territories degenerate into violence, or will Palestinians coordinate to undertake strategies to organize a Palestinian response? This brief review Palestinian public opinion on preferences for non-violent strategies versus violent strategies, and examines what variables impact this dynamic.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

This report highlights some of the major milestones of the Arab democratic transition. The countries covered include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

This study examines Israel's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa and surveys a series of interventions that have taken place. It addresses in particular Israel's connections with Ethiopia and Eritrea and briefly touches on Israel's meddling in the 1950s and 1960s in Sudan and Yemen. The study looks at Israeli intervention in Africa from the prism of Israel as a spearhead for colonial countries, most notably the United States, whose mission is to work against Arab causes and against Soviet influence in Africa. The study argues that the support Israel received from colonial powers gave it a significant part of what the newly-independent and newly-formed African states needed, and that based on this experience Israel was able to exploit the needs of many African countries for weapons and training. This came both in terms of weapons purchase, use and maintenance, in addition to training armies and security forces. The paper also examines how Israel exploited African countries' need for technical help in vital areas such as agriculture and medical services.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

Civil society rests on the principle of economic independence from politics, deemed to be a long-standing precondition to limiting the despotism of a political authority and its ability to wreak havoc on society. The paper poses the question of why civil society has thus far failed to materialize in Algeria, despite the existence of political pluralism in the country dating to the 1989 Constitution. The author contends that the persistence of rentierism in the Algerian economy has enabled the country’s government to prevent the rise of a genuine civil society in Algeria, despite the de jure acceptance of political pluralism in the country. The government has been able to use the levers of a rentier economy to subdue the political elites and dominate society, effectively controlling the political fallout of economic liberalization. The paper goes on to survey the political economic context, which led to the failure of a democratic transition in Algeria, by exploring how private capital was unable to echo the catalyzing role played by the European bourgeoisie in the democratization and political modernization of their continent.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This text is considered foundational to international relations, in defence of the theoretical model of realism, which was subjected - after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union - to heavy criticism, glorifying what they described as "the triumph of Western liberalism" and beginning an academic debate on the value of realist theory to the field. The value of this text comes from its author, Kenneth Waltz, who is considered the founder of structural realism and who established this theory through his formative book Theory of International Politics (1979), which is considered the most influential IR work of the Cold War era. In this text, Waltz responds to the criticism levelled at realism, demonstrating its capacity to interpret in spite of changes in the structure of the international system.

​Many analysts and observers believe the opposition media played a critical role in ousting Morsi through their printed and television outlets, which reported against him for a whole year. This paper examines Egyptian media’s policies, starting from Morsi’s becoming president at the end of June 2012 and extending to the stage following his ouster until now. The paper lists the main strategies adopted by the media and lays out models of Egyptian media’s international coverage. It also explores the motives behind the work of some media outlets and their common traits and tries to explain why the media adopted this type of discourse. The paper also highlights the forms of provocation practiced by several Egyptian media outlets against the coup opponents and detects several rumors spread by the media and their source.