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There exists an ongoing dispute in academia about the underlying reasons behind growing Chinese influence in Africa and the success of the foreign policy of the emerging Asian giant, China, in the wealthy continent. The findings of this study reveal that despite China’s huge geo-economic progress in Africa, its foreign policy is still a far cry from making it a decisive key player in its influence on Africa’s political systems. African countries have to face global challenges and handle political and economic reform through adopting a united vision of development and security and assuming historical responsibility to defend their independence and dignity. This is how they can live up to the slogan “Africa for Africans” and make the fortunes and resources of this rich continent beneficial for everyone.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

In an effort to understand the characteristics of "virtual communities" and specifically "information societies," this study attempts to test the argument that virtual communities, with their networked structure, pose a challenge (or represent an alternative) to traditional hierarchical structures, due to the former's ability to self-organize, and settle their internal disputes without the need for authoritative intervention. The study uses the case study approach, applied to 3 Wikipedia's edit wars. The chosen cases are related to a number of Middle East informational crises. The study concludes that mechanisms of virtual societies (e.g. self-organization) can work efficiently in cases of limited disputes, but in cases of sharp disagreements, traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms that include authoritative intervention and exercising some form of power, in a "top-down" approach, remain essential for conflict resolution. This implies that the factor of "authority" remains significant even in the context of virtual communities.

The wave of democracy, peaceful or violent, has up till now dispelled many of the illusions prevalent in the West, in Europe especially, including so-called "Arab exceptionalism"—that is the notion that Arabs are not interested in democracy, are indifferent to whether it is present in their lives or not, and are basically not ready for it. A second dismantled illusion is that of the "good dictator" that is based on the claim that dictators loyal to the West are a better bet than the Islamist alternative. A third illusion concerns the idea that the Arab world is itself a construct and that the attractiveness of a supranational Arab identity has gone. The Arab revolutions, however, have proved the above theories wrong. It is not a coincidence that the wave for change broke out in a number of Arab states at the same time and in the same fashion with more or less the same slogans shouted out in the same language, and were able in a very short time to bring down four regimes. The Arab revolutions took academic circles by surprise and made some academics claim that understanding the future of Middle East politics required that academics carry out a serious reassessment of the restored importance of Pan-Arab identity.

This study raises several pressing questions: Was the fall of the Salvation Regime in Sudan the result of an internal initiative or the opposition coalition, or both? To what extent did external dynamics influence the overthrow of regime and the transition to democracy? Is the post-Salvation regime likely to follow a democratic trajectory, or will it turn into another authoritarian regime? The study concludes that it is likely that the agreed goal between the international powers and their authoritarian partners in the region is to move Sudan to a "hybrid" system, where the elements of the old authoritarian regime remain in power, while maintaining a minimum level of democracy. In addition, the ruling military-civilian coalition will find support from the United States and the European Union (and their regional allies), enabling it to dismantle the institutions of the former regime, accommodate a number of armed movements in the political process, and gradually integrate into the international (security and economic) system. Meanwhile, domestically, the transitional government will face challenges that may not only lead to the collapse of the transitional process, but also to the collapse of the Sudanese state itself.

This study builds on the assumption that any change in the structure of the international system in the foreseeable future cannot be immediately ascribed to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, even if the pandemic is purely incidental and unable to change the existing distribution of power, this does not mean it has not introduced a dialogue within International Relations on the impact of epidemics on the structure of the international system, and their ability to intensify some essential - economic, social, and political - factors that contribute to international system change. International power balances before the outbreak of the pandemic indicate the beginning of change of the international system, as if it has been moving towards multipolarity, particularly with many rising powers, such as China, Russia and the European Union, whose international interests challenge those of the US, especially as the latter persistently impedes any rise of rival powers in the foreseeable future.

The aim of this Study is to provide policy options for Pakistan in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) dispute with India. A special focus is on the crisis following the Indian revocation of J&K's special status in August 2019. Since then there is not just a complete blackout in J&K but also another low in the India-Pakistan relationship. Based on the analysis of the diplomatic support that Islamabad has received from the international community in general and the Muslim world in particular, this paper argues that Pakistan has to mainly rely on what it can do on its own. By examining how the present crisis is a direct outcome of how this conflict has transpired and evolved over the last seven decades, this paper draws a series of measures which the Pakistani government can take at its own and in collaboration with international actors to obtain support for a sustainable solution to the J&K dispute.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

The paper investigates and analyzes the regional and international interactions with the conflict in Libya, focusing on the period following the December 2015 political agreement in Skhirat, Morocco. The paper argues that this agreement is the result of a limited consensus among domestic and regional forces. These forces have moulded their foreign policies, over the course of the conflict, based on a balance between concerns over the political and economic effects of the Libyan democratic transition and their interests and ambitions for greater control and influence. The conflict of interests between the external forces was a substantial factor along with other internal determinants that have contributed to obstructing the democratic transition process. Therefore, this paper explores a series of research questions, mainly focusing on the role and behavior of the influential external forces in Libya's domestic politics.