Latest Articles

​عقد المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات مؤتمره السنوي في قضايا التحول الديمقراطي في الوطن العربي، في مقر معهد الدوحة للدراسات العليا، حول موضوع "الجيش والسياسة في مرحلة التحول الديمقراطي في الوطن العربي". وبهذا يكون المؤتمر قد انعقد خمس دورات، منذ أول مرة عقد فيها؛ إذ بحثت دورته الأولى في موضوع "الإسلاميون ونظام الحكم الديمقراطي: تجارب واتجاهات" )تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 2012 ، وتناولت ثانيتُها موضوع "الإسلاميون ونظام الحكم الديمقراطي: مسائل المواطنة والدولة والأمة"أيلول/ سبتمبر 2013، وبحثت ثالثتُها في "المسألة الطائفية وصناعة الأقليات في المشرق العربي الكبير" في البحر الميت/ الأردن )أيلول/ سبتمبر 2014 وناقشت رابعتُها "العنف والسياسة في المجتمعات العربية" في تونس أيلول/ سبتمبر 2015.

US and Gulf relations are based on more than self-interest, but common selfinterest is always a key (or the key) factor in shaping an alliance and strategic relationship. The key common self-interests that drives US and Arab Gulf relations are security – the need to deal with Iran, fighting extremism, and securing the flow of petroleum exports out of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to meet the needs of the global economy, and to provide the key source of income for the Gulf states. This study explains why the United States maintains close ties with its Arab strategic partners in the Gulf. The study finds out that the US and its Gulf strategic partners face serious challenges, including domestic political change in the US, divisions between Arab states, the impact of regional conflicts and instability, and the growing role of non-Western powers.

The relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and its effect on the Lebanese state is here examined. Divided into five parts the study first tackles Iran’s movements in Lebanese space and their connection to Hezbollah’s evolution. The second part focuses on Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and on Hezbollah as an intervention tool. The third part describes Hezbollah’s relationship with Lebanon since the party’s creation as well as the Taif Agreement and the subsequent change in the foundations of that relationship. The fourth part sheds light on the intervention of Iran and Syria in the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Finally, the fifth part explores Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

​Using a realist approach, this study explains the development of international institutions in the Arab system, taking the Arab League and the Arab Monetary Fund as case studies. It puts to the test realist assumptions regarding states as major actors in the international system and examines how the principle of chaos and the absence of central authority affect their behaviour. In this context, the prisoner's dilemma is used as a mirror for security interactions and chaotic structures in the Arab and international systems. The study shows that realist assumptions are not sufficient to explain the development of Arab institutions; they need to be modified to explain the variation in international behaviour in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on an analysis of the reward environment in which Arab countries interact, and its division into a security-military sphere and a political-economic sphere.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

​This article discusses relations between Sudan and Iran against the background of the many Israeli air strikes against Sudan, and asks whether the ruling regime in Sudan favors Iran over the Arab states when it comes to dealing with its political and security concerns, or whether Sudan sees no issue in playing both sides. It also examines the dreams of Islamic leadership and the transnational revolutionary tendency espoused by Hassan al-Turabi, and the effect of this among his disciples in terms of their view of and links with Iran. The study also takes Iranian support for Islamic movements in Gaza via Sudan as an example of cooperation where the tactical and short term intersects with long term strategy. The paper also discusses the Islamists’ coming to power as a result of the Arab revolutions, and the potential for the revival of transnational revolution included in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and the effect of this on relations between the Arab states and their collective and individual relations with Iran.

Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

This section examines the most significant political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we feature two documents from Yemen and Egypt, covering the period from September 1 to October 31, 2024.

The Iranian nuclear agreement was the result of a pressing domestic need. This paper discusses the factors that pushed Iran to sign a nuclear deal and argues that the circumstances under which Hassan Rouhani became Iranian president meant he had to achieve a political détente in foreign relations within 100 days in office. Moreover, this pressing détente had to address the issue of sanctions. The successive rounds of US and Western sanctions drained the “resistance economy” and pushed it to resort to “heroic flexibility in diplomacy” whose lines were drawn by Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei. This paved the way for a change in politicians’ rhetoric and performance vis-à-vis relations with the US.