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The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its capture of vast territories in the Fertile Crescent, has confounded the political calculations of a number of all major political players invested in the Arab region, including regional and global powers. With the failure of regional actors to contain the group, the United States was forced to backtrack on its military withdrawal from the region—when it pulled its troops out of Iraq—and become involved, anew, in the Middle East.

​Events in Mosul, which was captured by ISIL on June 9, 2014, cannot be viewed in isolation from the severe political crisis afflicting the post 2003 Iraqi political regime. Generally speaking, radical groups cannot be separated from the political environment that fostered them. They are the product of a structurally imbalanced political situation. The growth of such groups in Iraq, from Al Qaeda to ISIL, provides a textbook lesson of this. They are the expression of an imbalance political situation, even if they develop and assume an independence from the political context that gave birth to them. They grow, develop, and draw oxygen from these imbalances and from sharp political and social divisions. Hence, it is not possible to defend the idea that these groups have autonomous power, rather their power derives from the acceptance of their social incubator in a political context that this incubator allows to play a role in correcting the balances of power, as a tool or revenge, pressure, influence, or the like.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

Sponsored by the “Safer World” foundation, based in the United Kingdom, this meeting held at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies examined possibilities for the spreading of peace and stability across conflict hotspots around the globe.

Following the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last August, Iranian-American relations now appear set for a major breakthrough, overturning more than three decades of enmity between the two sides. Such a breakthrough, should it come to pass, has the potential to completely transform the bilateral relations over a number of issues, including most importantly the Iranian nuclear program, Iran’s regional role and its involvement in the Middle East’s “hot button” issues, including in the Gulf. The eventual success of efforts to bring Iran and the United States closer together, however, relies also on the roles played by regional players, particularly Israel. This paper explores the reasons behind Israeli anxiety surrounding a potential breakthrough in Iranian-American relations, and Tel Aviv’s ability to influence the outcome of a possible agreement over Iran’s nuclear program and whether such an agreement shall extend to Iran’s regional influence.

Iran, over the past four decades, lived through a state of continuous alert to defend itself against the threats surrounding it and targeting its national security. Over that period, Iran did not enjoy clear recognition of its legitimacy from the major powers, the United States in particular. This created ongoing anxiety and restricted Iran’s efforts of “preserving the regime”, which Ayatollah Khomeini made the highest duty. These circumstances had tangible effects on Iranian national security and its strategy. The article sees that the nuclear agreement might be the beginning of a new phase. Via the agreement, Iran feels it has gained the recognition of the international community, and acknowledgement of its demand for legitimacy. Most importantly for Iran, the agreement shifts it away from the obsession with security and stability, and encourages it to bring out the features of the “Iranian model” in the region. The paper also discusses the fears of neighboring states and Iran’s efforts to reassure them. The positions of the political currents and the power centers in Iran are also considered as well as their differences over the pluses and minuses of the agreement.

The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.

This paper addresses the implications of the transformation of the international system from a bipolar to a unipolar system for realist theory. The paper demonstrates and analyzes how realists react to this external challenge. The paper demonstrates the traditional response to the "attack" on realism, in an attempt to preserve its basic premises. It then proceeds to explain the different revisionist orientations undertaken by the theorists of this school in an attempt to harmonize the foundations of this theory with unipolarity. The study deals with four revisionist approaches: "balance of threat", "soft balance", "balance of interests" and "external balancing". This paper presents a new addition, "internal balancing" which, while derived from the liberal theory opposed to realism, comes with a realist adaptation to explain the length of the current unipolar era.