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ﺗﺒﻨ ﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻮن اوروﺑﻴﻮن واﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﻮن واÈ ﻋﻼم واﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، ﺑﺤﻤﺎسٍ، ﺳﻨﺔ 2011، ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد ا وروﺑﻲ ﺑﺪﻋﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻮّل اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺑﺴﺨﺎء. وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻟﻢ ﻳﺮقَاوروﺑﻴﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى وﻋﻮدﻫﻢ؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ودوﻟﻪ اﻋﻀﺎء، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺤﺮب اﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان، واﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻓﻲ أﺧﺮى، إﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻔﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ ﻋﻮارض ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات. وﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﺆﺛ ﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، أﺛ ﺮت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ. ﺗﺤﻠﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﻨﺎﻫﺞ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ "اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ"، وأدواﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ، وأوﻟﻮﻳﺎﺗﻪ، وﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪى اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اورﺑﻲ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﻮﻧﺲ. In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. Te EU pledged to generously support transformation processes initiated in the region. Yet, Europeans – as other third parties – have not lived up to their promises. Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings turning into violence and civil war in some countries and authoritarian restoration in others, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Indeed, rather than the EU impacting on the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring, these dynamics have strongly impacted on Europe. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper analyzes the EU's approaches, instruments and priorities – and how the latter have changed over the course of the last years.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.

We seek, through this special issue, to contribute to the broader scholarly effort aimed at rethinking the trajectory of the formation of the Arab state and its evolution into its current form, by deconstructing its internal structure and analyzing its dynamics in light of its own conditions and contexts. The studies included in this issue also aim to move beyond ready-made and complete interpretive frameworks by approaching the Arab state as a historical, political, and social entity with its own internal logic and distinct paths of development, rather than reducing it to imported explanatory models or external normative projections.

Since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2010-2011, the teaching of public administration has been constantly evolving. Cases from Morocco, Qatar, and other countries in the Arab region have demonstrated the need for more robust cultural competency approaches on all major disciplines in public administration at the master's degree level. The Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA) and the American Society of Public Administration (ASPA) have also intensified their focus is on preparing students and faculty for culturally diverse workplaces and establishing departments for effective public administration in the Arab region. Through applying qualitative analysis of documents and content in presenting relevant research published in the English language in the past two decades, this study examines the impact of the value added by the inclusion of cultural competency skills in public administration programs in the MENA region on good governance. It also suggests possible avenues for future US-Middle East partnerships to address training and educational gaps.

This article examines the "intuitive knowledge" as one of the most important sources for understanding the trajectories of the Arab revolutions, despite the scarcity of studies that focus on it. We explore intuitive knowledge by examining its observable manifestations, such as its role as an alternative to "ideology" in expressing social and political views, its practical application in shared traditions, its flexible interpretation of relational life emphasising its habitual and voluntary aspects, its pragmatic evaluation of social and political phenomena, and its expression of distrust in "elites" who distance themselves from ordinary people's lives. Building on these premises, we explore the relationship between intuitive thought and charismatic phenomena or volatile populism, as well as the formation and dissolution of loyalty relationships, particularly in the neoliberal era. In this context, we emphasise the importance of viewing intuitive knowledge as a starting point for analysing the relationship between political and social revolution. We argue that the separation of these two types of revolution has created additional opportunities for counter-revolution.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

The Arab region offers a rich ground for testing constructivist assumptions, and moving beyond both realism that focuses on material power and liberalism promises linear progress. If international politics is shaped by shared intersubjective meanings, the region's interplay of history, identity, religion, culture, and interests makes it ideal for developing and challenging constructivist approaches.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.