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This study examines the ability of network technology to challenge despotism regimes. It thus applies two theoretical approaches. The first is the "Prisoner's dilemma" and the "despot/jailer's dilemma" and the second is the "case study", which studies a number of cases of "network technology", whether used by protest groups or by authoritarian regimes, to determine the extent (and direction) of their impact in practice. The study concludes that network technology — through challenging the logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" and reversing it to become the "jailer's dilemma" — can, theoretically, pose an element of weakness for despotism regimes. However, in reality, network technology can be used by these regimes with the same effectiveness, to respond to mass protests supported by technology. This indicates that network technology can be seen as a neutralizing factor, the impact of which should be studied relative to the impact of other factors.

The Gulf states, collectively and individually, no longer enjoy the luxury of stability and security they did over the three decades that preceded the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) now faces new kinds of threats more serious than any since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime at the hands of American forces in 2003. Notably, to date the GCC States have been among the states that have benefited most from the fall of dictatorial regimes in countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The UAE, for instance, has benefited in particular, becoming the favored destination for direct foreign investment in the region. The growing spread of regional instability however has created what could be called an unstable backyard for the Gulf, as its security and stability is threated in unprecedented fashion on a number of fronts, locally, regionally, and internationally. The GCC states must therefore adjust and change their political and strategic practices and policies so as to become more capable and more flexible in confronting and managing conflicts and crises. Ultimately, it is not just their security which is under threat but their very existence.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻣﻨﺬ أواﺧﺮ أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017 أزﻣﺔ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻫﻲ ا ﻛﺜﺮ ﺣﺪةً ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ ﻋﺎم 1981. ﺑﺪأت ا زﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﻤﻠﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴّﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻗﺎدﺗﻬﺎ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ إﻋﻼم ﺳﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وإﻣﺎراﺗﻴﺔ. وﺑﺨﻼف أزﻣﺔ ﺳﺤﺐ اﻟﺴﻔﺮاء ﻋﺎم 2014، أﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﺛﻼث دول ﺧﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، واﻣﺎرات ﻣﻊ ﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 2017، ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﻓﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺛﻢ ﺳﻠ ﻤﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺐ، وأﻣﻬﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻳﺎم ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ أو ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ. وﻓﻲ اﻃﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ، ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪول إﻟﻰ ﻋﺰل ﻗﻄﺮ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴًﺎ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺒﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻀﻮع، ﻏﻴﺮ أنّ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﺑﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﺗﺠﺎه ازﻣﺔ، وﺑﺪأت ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺪور اﻟﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ. ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺬور ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺎراﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺮﺟﺔ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺗﺪاﺧﻞ أدوار ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﻦ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺪوﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ. Since late May 2017, the Gulf region has been witness to the most intense diplomatic crisis since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Tis paper attempts to highlight the roots of the present-day Gulf crisis and explore the potential, complicated outcomes, taking in the roles of various regional and global players. Te crisis begun with a vicious smear campaign against Qatar and led by Saudi- and Emirati-state owned media. In contrast to the 2014 diplomatic rif in which the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were withdrawn from Doha, this latest crisis also included a complete severing of diplomatic ties on the part of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in addition to Egypt.To this was later added a complete blockade of Qatar by air, sea and land. Te countries leading the siege on Doha later presented a ten-point ultimatum to Qatar to fulfill within 10 days. A further attempt by the countries leading the blockade to isolate Qatar on the world stage failed, however, as leading world powers opted to play a more constructive role and mediate an end to the crisis.

Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.

​Using a realist approach, this study explains the development of international institutions in the Arab system, taking the Arab League and the Arab Monetary Fund as case studies. It puts to the test realist assumptions regarding states as major actors in the international system and examines how the principle of chaos and the absence of central authority affect their behaviour. In this context, the prisoner's dilemma is used as a mirror for security interactions and chaotic structures in the Arab and international systems. The study shows that realist assumptions are not sufficient to explain the development of Arab institutions; they need to be modified to explain the variation in international behaviour in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on an analysis of the reward environment in which Arab countries interact, and its division into a security-military sphere and a political-economic sphere.

​This paper aims to analyze European Gulf relations based on the Interdependence created by the 1988 agreement, and the subsequent transformations in the relationships. The interdependence approach assumes that there is an overlap of interests between both parties, and a degree of mutual engagement, thus limiting conflict and enhancing cooperation and coordination, which entails harmonizing the movement of its parties within the international system. Nonetheless testing the effectiveness of this approach in the context of a crisis which divides one of the parties (the Gulf in our case) remains problematic. The paper tries to probe this issue, and reveal the limitations of the interdependence model in this context. It similarly attempts to test the impact of the Gulf Crisis on a European Sub Policy towards the Gulf by analyzing the behaviours of the main actors in the EU (Germany, France, and- despite brexit- the UK).

The phenomenon of shale oil has returned to the forefront of politics. Unconventional oil and gas have been known to exist for some time and are available in large quantities. But the high cost of production has prevented their commercial extraction in the past. The rise of the price of oil since early 2001, however, has reignited interest. This paper examines this new interest and its impact on the price of oil in international markets. It also looks at the possible repercussions that could emerge in the long run among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States on the economic, political and geostrategic levels. The oil shale resources available globally could enable this resource to become one of the most important unconventional fuel sources in the world. In addition to its ubiquitous presence in North America, it is available in large quantities in Brazil, historic Palestine, Jordan, Indonesia, China, Australia, Estonia, France, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and South Africa. If these countries, which include major industrial nations and others on their way to become significant industrial forces, were to begin extracting their oil, all the economic, political and geostrategic calculations that have been based on conventional fuel will have to be reconsidered.

India-Qatar relations have come a long way since the two nations established diplomatic ties in 1973. Despite a slow start, relations between the two countries have improved significantly in recent years, driven by shared economic interests and increasing cooperation in areas such as energy, defence, and culture. This article examines the trajectory of India-Qatar relations and the factors that have shaped their development. Within the broader theoretical framework of Complex Interdependence, this study analyses the economic and geopolitical factors driving India's engagement with Qatar, as well as the role of cultural and people-to-people ties in strengthening the relationship. It also considers the challenges that have impeded progress in India-Qatar relations, including regional tensions and political differences. Despite the promising growth in India-Qatar relations, this article argues that the relationship remains largely stagnant in the political and strategic domain, with Qatar's independent policymaking contributing to India's inhibitions to pursue a relationship more forcefully beyond economic transactions.

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.