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Many American observers agree that the recent Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip represented a major challenge for the administration of President Barack Obama because it aggravated the international crises facing American foreign policy and shed light once again on the subject of the decline of American leadership. This paper discusses the decline in the capabilities of the American presidency under Obama and sheds light on the failure of the United States to deal, as it should have, with the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, which was unprecedented in size, destruction, and duration. The paper gives particular focus on the increasing inability of the United States to confront Israeli intransigence.

The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

Through a critical review, this paper examines the most important issues raised during the political forum for "The Washington Institute," a forum devoted to the discussion of US policies in the Middle East. This is based in a belief of the importance of critical interaction with the outcomes of policy centers in the United States, given the global significance of these centers in terms of impact on American foreign policy making or critical discussions aimed at understanding what the Washington institute promotes. A critical view is needed in particular around the Zionist and Israeli interests of the institute. The paper also focusses on the objectives of the political forum, and a call for redefining the allies of the US in the region and the establishment of a strategic constellation of allies that include Israel and other Arab countries.​

The purpose of this paper is to document Qatar's recent contribution of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. We consider Qatar as an example of a mini state that relies on its wealth and soft power to further its interests in the Middle East and support a beleaguered Arab-Muslim state. The paper carries out analysis of Arabic newspapers and other documentary evidence to contextualize and estimate Qatar's financial contribution from 2010 to 2016. Contextualizing Qatar's aid necessitates considering Israel's military control of the Palestinian Territories, and its ability through hard power to regulate the inflow of aid to Palestine. The paper concludes by calling for adopting the political economy perspective in dealing with humanitarian aid.

Scholars studying the Middle East often challenge the IR discipline's Eurocentric framings of the world by emphasizing the particularities of the Middle East, which defy and challenge the universality of Western-rooted IR theories. Social constructivism, focusing on agency and processes, has been regarded by many as an approach with the potential of taking into consideration specific historical, ideational, and cultural contexts in the Middle East region. Social constructivism, as developed by Alexander Wendt (1992 , 1994 , 1999), seems to lend itself especially well to adaptations to provide insights for the Middle East. This article revisits some aspects of Wendt's constructivism and explores its applicability in the Middle East. The article examines Wendt's cultures of anarchy to show how cooperative relations transform into conflict through processes of interaction. I examine how the Middle East provides both a potential and challenge to his argument by examining the case of Saudi relations with Hamas, with a particular focus on the episode of the 2009 Gaza war. The article examines the puzzle of how Saudi Arabia changed and evolved over the years from supporting Hamas and the Palestinian resistance to identifying it as an enemy, despite sharing pan-Islamism as a collective identity.

​This study investigates the forced displacement of Palestinians in the context of Zionist settler colonialism in Area C, including in the Jordan Valley, which represents more than 60 percent of the West Bank. The study details colonial policy in this region, analyzing the patterns of forced displacement in the villages of Bardala, al-Farisiyah, Al-Sakot, Khirbet Humsa, Al-Malih and Khirbet Al-Hama, based on the position of the region within the colonial project. It also evaluates the impact of this displacement on the geographical and demographic reality on the ground. It attempts to discuss the relationship between the use of forced displacement as a means to take control of the land, and to exploit and expel the Palestinians.

This review discusses the background of Technocracy Rising, and transformations in economics, governance, law, sustainable development and global order

ﺗﺪﻋﻲ اﻟﺮواﻳﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ أن ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967 اﻧﺪﻟﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ وﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺨﻄﻂ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺳﻠﻔ ﺎ، وﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮة اﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺻﺪر ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺒﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ وﻣﺬﻛﺮات ودراﺳﺎت ووﺛﺎﺋﻖ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ؛ ﺗﺮﺳﻢ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﻨﺎﻗﻀﺔ ﺗﻤﺎﻣًﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻻدﻋﺎء. ﺗﻌﺎﻟﺞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ ﻓﻲ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻗﺮارات اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ، وﻫﻲ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﻮﻟﺔ رﺳﻤﻴًﺎ وﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴًﺎ اﺗﺨﺎذَ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب، ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ودورﻫﺎ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻄ ﺎ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪًا؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺳﻌﺖ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻟﺨﻠﻖ اﻟﻔﺮﺻﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﺸﻦ اﻟﺤﺮب ورﻓﻀﺖ أي ﺣﻞ ﺳﻠﻤﻲ ﻟÑزﻣﺔ، واﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻻﺗﺨﺎذ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺮار. وﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ، واﻟﺨﻄﻂ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺿﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ارﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻐﺮض ﺗﻮﺳﻴﻊ ﺣﺪود إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967، إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﻔﻲ إﺷﻜﻮل. Te official Israeli narrative of the June 1967 War depicts the country as having been dragged unwillingly into a conflict for which it had not planned. A close inspection of a number of detailed sources, scattered across a variety of published Hebrew materials, paint a picture entirely at odds with such a claim however. In this paper, the author addresses the Israeli decision to go to war in June 1967 by examining the steps taken by the Israeli government—legally, the only body mandated to declare war. Te author also examines the developments in the stance taken by the Israeli military command, which was instrumental in the decision to go to war. At the time, the Israeli military worked to create the right opportunity to declare war, refusing to accept any attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict and coerced the government into war through a variety of means.