Latest Articles

Transboundary rivers have been a source of increasing disputes due to growing populations and economies, as well as the consequences of environmental change. With the increase in river flow utilization, concerns about potential violent interstate conflicts have arisen in public debates. However, academic literature argues for more nuanced and evidence-based views of transboundary water conflicts and proposes problem-solving tools based on water diplomacy and cooperation. Using the Eastern Nile conflict as a case study, this paper identifies eight common misconceptions regarding the conflict surrounding the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The paper contextualizes the GERD conflict within the broader transformation of river utilization towards greater competition for water use. The ongoing Eastern Nile conflict goes beyond technical affairs related to the dam operations and involves broader issues of rights to water use, national development, and climate variability and change. It is also embedded in complex regional hydro-politics that involves new actors. Recent academic evidence shows that Eastern Nile riparian countries (Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) face unique negotiating realities and diverse environmental impacts as a result of the GERD conflict. The Eastern Nile conflict presents an opportunity to facilitate benefit-sharing in the Nile Basin. Water cooperation remains the only realistic option to resolve transboundary water conflicts in the region.

From an economic standpoint, this study aims to comprehend the reasons for the popular uprising outbreak, as well as the chances for democratic transition from a political economy angle. It examines the influence of the rentier state economic growth regime on the political prospects of citizens, particularly young people, who are convinced that such a regime will not lead to their ultimate safety, but rather to their economic marginalization due to the system's poor performance. It turns out that adopting a more comprehensive and long-term growth approach has become even more critical. As time goes by, it became evident that reform comes at a hefty cost on all fronts. Rather than being a tributary and assistance to the continuance of economic reforms, political reforms became an impediment and took on even greater importance than economic reform itself. The Algerian situation, according to the study, is an example of the intractable model of democratic transition in all its manifestations, since the incumbent system was pleased with restricted constitutional arrangements, notably elections. This has strengthened the rentier state in all its forms, including the political system's fragility and the succession of crises it has faced since independence till today.

This article draws from structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology, seeking to build a bridge between the realist–liberal and rationalist–reflectivist debates in the field of international relations. In doing so, it argues against the neorealist claim that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process. It further argues that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from the anarchic structure of the international system, but are generated by process rather than by structure. There is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one particular structure of identities and interests rather than another. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy – anarchy is what states make of it. The article explores three ways in which identities and interests are transformed under anarchy: by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities.

This study provides an analysis of Egypt's political system since 2013 , with a particular focus on President Sisi's efforts to establish and manage a "new republic." It explores the internal factors that influence the structure and nature of the regime and examines the regional and international contexts that shape this endeavor and contribute to its support, despite concerns over authoritarian practices and significant human rights violations. the study aims to elucidate the foundational principles, defining characteristics, and key dimensions of the "new republic." It also evaluates its strengths, prospects for success, functional role, and the reasons for substantial international endorsement of the regime. Furthermore, it assesses the extent to which the regime's rhetoric regarding the new republic aligns with practical realities and appraises President Sisi's efficacy in implementing this vision.

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013, examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

This article discusses the challenges facing the government of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq, and outlines what ought to be expected in the coming stage, particularly after the fall of Mosul to ISIL. The paper reviews the failure of the regime post 2002 to insure equal participation of all segments of Iraq in the institution of power following the sectarian polices adopted by Nouri al-Maliki who exercised control over all the levers of the political regime and the public political institutions, and systematically harassed other politicians and parties – Sunnis in particular. The paper also reviews the American position, the intervention of the international coalition, and the establishment of the national guard. It looks at the other challenges facing the effort to keep Iraq together and help it emerge from its problems, including the threat of ISIL, sectarian division, the security situation, and the economy. The paper also reviews the regional overlap with the Iraqi situation, particularly the Iranian aspect, and what is transpiring as a new regional equation.

This study explores the relationship and reciprocal influence between the political authority in Iran, led by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the religious authority in Najaf, led by the Grand Ayatollah and marja', Ali al-Sistani. Rather than focusing exclusively on jurisprudential/ideological doctrines, the paper approaches the subject from a perspective that emphasizes the interactive relationship between the structure and the agency. It suggests that the emergence of the Islamic regime in Iran, based on the principle of Willayat Al-Faqih, had a significant impact on reshaping power relations in the Shi'i theological space and the response of Shi'i religious actors. At the same time, the practices adopted by al-Sistani in Iraq after 2003 , the context he was responding to, and the emergence of the Marji ʿ yya as an extraconstitutional actor, allowed for the formation of an alternative transitional model, which I term a "neo-traditional authority". The study argues for an alternative to two theses: first, the potential decline of the traditional Marji ʿ yya due to the dominance of the Willayat Al-Faqih in Iran, put forward in particular by Mehdi Khalaji, and second, the superiority and continuity of the traditional Marji ʿ yya due to its depoliticization, contended by Linda Wallbridge. The paper also maintains that there is an interpretive framework that meets the two theses in the middle, represented by the rise of the neo-traditional Marji ʿ yya and the possibility it will emerge as an alternative model in the future.